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Abstract
This Article addresses the issue of employee blogging and the interplay between 
such blogging and the asserted recent decline in American “social capital.”  Relying on 
the recent work of Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam, we argue that blogging by 
employees can play an important role in helping reverse the decline in social capital but
that current legal structures impede that goal. The Article proposes state legislative 
reforms to ameliorate this situation.
We begin Part I by developing the argument that there is an important relationship 
between employee blogging and American social capital. Part II presents a review of 
blogs and the blogging phenomena. Part III discusses blogs in the context of Professor 
Putnam’s path-breaking work, and examines the special place employment and the 
workplace have in the social capital story. Part IV more specifically analyzes the role 
blogs play as generators of social capital, particularly in the employment context. Part V 
looks at the protections afforded employee bloggers under the National Labor Relations 
Act.  Part VI then examines the issue in the context of both state common and statutory 
law. In Part VII we review various options for legal reform in the area, and ultimately 
recommend as the best approach specific state legislative action, i.e., the amendment of 
state statutes protecting off-duty tobacco usage to also protect off-duty employee 
blogging. Part VIII concludes our work.
3I. Introduction
Blogs have become a very important part of American life, and especially its 
“online culture”.1 Over 8 million Americans have blogs and that number is increasing 
exponentially on an ongoing basis.2 This Article examines blogs in the context of 
Harvard Professor Robert D. Putnam’s recent seminal book Bowling Alone: The Collapse 
and Revival of American Community.3 More specifically, it examines blogs by workers 
in the context of Putman’s work.4
Putnam avers that there has been a quite sharp decline in community/social 
connectedness, or what he calls “social capital”, in the United States in recent decades.5
Dual career families,6 increased mobility,7 and long commutes to work,8 have all, among 
1 See Pew Internet & American Life Project, The State of Blogging, January 2005, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_blogging_data.pdf.
2 Id. The impact that blogs are having in all aspects of our lives is beginning to 
catch the attention of leading legal scholars. Richard A. Posner, Book Review, Bad News, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2005, at 1 (noting how blogs are challenging existing paradigms in 
American politics, journalism and culture); Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: 
Statistical Means, Deliberation and Information Markets,  80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1022-
23 (2005) (describing the use of blogs in information sharing and information processing 
by groups); Michael J. Gerhardt, Review Essay, The First Amendment’s Biggest Threat, 
How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control 
Creativity, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1798, 1819 (2005) (describing the impact of blogs in both 
First Amendment and Intellectual Property law developments); R. Polk Wagner, On 
Software Regulation, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 457, 476 (2005) (describing the explosion of 
blogs and its effects on the software regulation).
3
 Robert D. Putnam, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2001).
4 See also Robert D. Putnam & Lewis M. Feldstein, BETTER TOGETHER, 
RESTORING THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2003).
5 See Putnam, supra note 3 at 170. 
6 Id. at 194-203.
7 Id. at 204-215.
4other factors arguably contributed to the sharp American social capital decline.
According to Putnam the precipitous decrease in the percentage of Americans belonging 
to private sector labor unions, to now only 7.8% of the workforce,9 is also part of this 
phenomenon. 
This Article argues that for many employees blogs have become the new “union 
hall”.10 Blogs give employees the ability to communicate easily with other employees 
about work.11 Blogs also provide employees with the opportunity to mix discussions 
8 See Extreme Commuting, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 21, 2005 at 80, 81 (citing the 
work of Prof. Putnam).
9 See Union Members in 2004, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Press 
Release, Jan. 27, 2005.
10
“Our virtual union hall is where we can simply  “hang out” with our colleagues 
in the struggle and “carry on” about anything from world events to labor issues to home 
cooking recipes.” Thomas A. Santora, The Virtual Union Hall, 181, in THE CYBERUNION 
HANDBOOK: TRANSFORMING LABOR THROUGH COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY, Arthur B. 
Shostak (ed.) (2002) (describing the use of computer technology in efforts by unions in 
organizing new members).  Traditionally the union hall was a place where employees 
gathered both to conduct the business of the union, but also to socialize and to build 
community.  
11
 Employees might blog in order to obtain feedback from fellow employees about 
work-related issues. For example, employees might blog about technical aspects of their 
jobs and to share information, or seek advice regarding the substantive aspects of what 
they do.  Bloggers of this type can be found in a variety of professions such as law, 
(Legal Blogs, http://law-library.rutgers.edu/resources/lawblogs.html/, (last visited March 
1, 2006)); accounting, Accountants Who Blog, http://accountant.intuit.com/
practice_resources/practice_development/articles/ss_accountantswhoblog.aspx/ (last 
visited August 1, 2005); medicine, DB’s Medical Rants, 
http://www.medrants.com/index.php/, (last visited March 1, 2006); as well as in other 
industries such as the construction industry, (Construction Web Logs, 
http://www.greatpossibilities.com/blogs/index.php/, (last visited March 1, 2006). 
Similarly, employees might blog to share stories about their jobs, and to keep their co-
workers informed about issues of collective concern. An example of the latter is LANL: 
The Real Story, a blog established by a group of scientists at the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory in response to a decision by the Laboratory’s Director to shut down the 
operation due to concerns about security and safety violations.  The blog was created in 
order to “provide an uncensored forum where those concerned about the future of LANL 
may express their views.” LANL: The Real Story, http://www.lanl-the-real-
5about work with pleasure, i.e., to create something of a sense of personal community with 
their co-workers.12 As such, blogs may provide employees with a potential real antidote 
to our society’s increasingly “go it alone”/ “bowling alone” culture.13
The question then becomes what legal protections are afforded employees that 
blog? This question has received heightened attention during the past couple of years as 
various high-profile cases of employees being fired for blogging activities have come to 
the public’s attention.14
story.blogspot.com/. The blog recently became the focus of Congressional hearings, with 
various parties arguing about the propriety of the venture.
12 See Haya El Nasser, Beyond Kiwanis: Internet Builds New Communities, USA 
TODAY, June 2, 2005, at A1. An example of this type of blogger includes Heather B. 
Armstrong who was fired from her web design job in 2002 for writing about work and 
colleagues on her blog, Dooce.com.  Armstrong was terminated almost precisely one year 
after she began blogging.  In one of her earlier postings she lists the reasons why she 
“should not be allowed to work from home.”  The list include: “Too many cushiony 
horizontal surfaces prime for nappage; 13 bowls of cereal today, all within a two hour 
period; Oprah; Total Request Live; Horizontal surfaces; Rabid Naked IMing; Shower? 
Why?; Porn; Have you seen my couch and it’s lovely horizontal surface?; That box of 
Wheaties is GONE; Passions; The nap after Passions; Too much time alone with two jars 
of Jif Peanut Butter; The nap to recover from all the naps; I can lie down underneath my 
desk and no one is going to know. No one.; Justin Timberlake.” Dooce.com, 
http://www.dooce.com/archives/daily/06_27_2001.html/, (June 27, 2001).
Perhaps the best known work related blogger of this kind is Ellen Simonetti.  
Before her termination in October 2004, Ms. Simonetti, also known as the “Queen of 
Sky”, told her readers the “semi-fictitious account of life as a flight attendant.”  Queen of 
Sky, http://queenofsky.journalspace.com/?    cmd=displaycomments&dcid=471&entryid=471/,  (Dec. 1, 
2004). As with other bloggers in this group, Ms. Simonetti’s blog blended work and 
private aspects of her life.  In an article she wrote following her termination, Ms. 
Simonetti noted that she had started her blog “as a form of therapy. I had lost my mother 
in September 2003 to cancer and that hit me hard. It was much easier to write about my 
feelings than talk about them.”  Ellen Simonneti, I Was fired For Blogging, CNET 
NEWS.COM, Dec., 16, 2004,  http://news.com.com/I+was+fired+for+blogging/2010-
1030_3-5490836.html?tag=nefd.ac&tag=nl.e540-2.
13 See Putnam, supra note 3 at 88.
14 See Christine Negroni, Fired Flight Attendant Finds Blogs Can Backfire, N.Y. 
TIMES, November 16, 2004, at C9; Krysten Crawford, Have a Blog, Lose Your Job?, 
CNN/Money, Feb. 15, 2005,  http://money.cnn.com/2005/02/14/  
6Although not widely recognized,15 most employees in the United States are 
“employees-at-will”, i.e., they can be fired by their employer at any time for essentially 
any reason.16 Put another way, employers have generally been legally free to fire 
employees for blogging.17
Somewhat ironically, the most comprehensive statutory legal protection currently 
afforded employee bloggers is probably the 1935 National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA),18 the law that gives workers the right to form private sector unions. This Article 
news/economy/blogging/?cnn=yes.  A group of those employees who have been 
terminated have started The Bloggers’ Rights BLOG. The Bloggers’ Rights BLOG
provides, 
“We, the inhabitants of the Blogosphere, do hereby proclaim that 
bloggers everywhere are entitled to the following basic rights:
Freedom To Blog.
Freedom From Persecution And Retaliation Because Of Our Blogs…
1.) If an employer wishes to discipline an employee because 
of his/her blog, it must first establish clear-cut blogging policies and 
distribute these to all of its employees.
2.) Blogging employees shall be given warning before being 
disciplined because of their blogs.
3.) NO ONE shall be fired because of his/her blog, unless the 
employer can prove that the blogger did intentional damage to said 
employer through the blog.
Blogophobic companies, who violate the Bloggers’ Bill of Rights, will be 
blacklisted by millions of bloggers the world over.” (emphasis in the original)
The Bloggers’ Rights BLOG, http://rights.journalspace.com/ (last visited March 1, 
2006).
15 See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker 
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 106 
(1987) (discussing the lack of knowledge individuals have regarding their rights, or 
absence of legal protections at work).
16 See infra notes 189 to 191 and accompanying text.
17 Id.
18
 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-169 (2003).
7argues, however, that for a variety of reasons the NLRA is proving ineffective in 
protecting the rights of employee bloggers.19 The Article will further aver that state 
common law exceptions to the doctrine of employment-at-will are also not providing 
much redress to employees fired or otherwise disciplined for blogging activities.20 Thus 
despite the arguably considerable social capital merits to employee blogging, on a de 
facto basis employee bloggers currently engage in such activity very much at their own 
peril.
This Article strongly argues for state legislative reform in this area. The template 
for such reform currently exists. Over the past two to three decades the vast majority of 
states have, at the behest of the tobacco industry, enacted state statutes protecting the off-
duty activities of employees at least to the extent such activity involves the off-duty use 
of tobacco products.21 Grounded on the notion of social capital, we argue, that the social 
value of employee off-duty blogging is at least as high as that of employee smoking.  We 
recommend that state level off-duty conduct statutes should thus be amended to provide 
explicit protection for this activity.22
Part II presents a review of blogs and the blogging phenomena. Part III discusses 
blogs in the context of Professor Putnam’s path-breaking work and the arguable decline 
in American social capital. It also examines the special place employment and the 
workplace have in the social capital story. Part IV more specifically analyzes the role 
19 See infra notes 107 to 188 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 194 to 231 and accompanying text.
21 See Jessica Jackson, Colorado’s Lifestyle Discrimination Statute: A Vast and 
Muddled Expansion of Traditional Employment Law, 67 COLO. L. REV. 143, 153-54
(1996).
22 See infra notes 275 to 283 and accompanying text.
8blogs play as generators of social capital, particularly in the employment context. Part V 
looks at the protections afforded employee bloggers under the National Labor Relations 
Act. Part VI then examines the issue in the context of both state common and statutory 
law.  In Part VII we review various options for legal reform in the area, and ultimately 
recommend as the best approach specific state legislative action, the amendment of state 
statutes protecting off-duty tobacco usage to also protect off-duty employee blogging. 
Part VIII concludes our work.
II. Blogs: A Primer
A. What is a Blog?
“A blog, you see, is a little First Amendment machine.”23
Webster’s Dictionary defines a blog as “an online diary; a personal chronological 
log of thoughts published on a Web page.”24  While accurate as far as it goes, this 
definition is by no means complete.  In fact, the very incompleteness of the definition 
reflects the very fast changing nature of the blogosphere.  
Not that long ago, blogs were associated with personal online diaries “typically 
concerned with boyfriend problems or techie news.”25  Writing about his early 
experiences in blogging, Andrew Sullivan, noted that to a large extent blogs were, 
23
 See Jay Rosen, PRESSTHINK, 
http://journalism.nyu.edu/pubzone/weblogs/pressthink/2005/01/15/berk_pprd.html/, 
(January 15, 2005, 19:55 EST).
24
 See Webster's New Millennium Dictionary of English, Preview Edition (2003).
25 See O’REILLY WEB DEVCENTER, 
http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/javascript/2002/06/13/megnut.html/ (June 13, 2002) 
(discussing some of the common features among weblogs).
9“quirky, small, often solipsistic enterprises.”26  He singled out the site of an earlier blog 
pioneer for discussing “among other things, his passion for sex and drugs,”27 and 
summarized his early impressions of blogs by noting that “reading them is like reading 
someone else’s diary over their shoulder.”28
At some point between the terrorists attacks of September 11, 2001, and the 
beginning of the war against Iraq, however, blogs became more than “streams of blurts 
about the writer’s day.”29  Both of these events generated a search for a new form of 
communication.  According to Sullivan, 
“The blog almost seemed designed for this moment.  In an instant, during 
the crisis, the market for serious news commentary soared.  But people 
were not just hungry for news, I realized.  They were hungry for 
communication, for checking their gut against someone they had come to 
know, for emotional support and psychological bonding.  In this world, the 
very personal nature of blogs had far more resonance than more 
impersonal corporate media products.  Readers were more skeptical of 
anonymous news organizations anyway, and preferred to supplement them 
with individual writers they knew and liked.”30
This account suggests that the dramatic events of the first few years of the new century 
created a need not only for information, but for a more interactive and personal form of 
26
 Andrew Sullivan, A Blogger Manifesto: Why Online Weblogs Are One Future 
For Journalism, Feb. 24, 2002, 
http://www.andrewsullivan.com/main_article.php?artnum=20020224.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 See Rebecca Blood, THE WEBLOG HANDBOOK, 1 (2002).
30 See Sullivan, supra note 26.  Blogs have proliferated at an incredible rate.  
Towards the end of the 1990s there were, perhaps, a dozen blogs. By the end of 2004, a 
reported 8 million people indicated having created blogs, and another 32 million people 
reported being regular readers.  See Hugh Hewitt, BLOG: UNDERSTANDING THE 
INFORMATION REFORMATION THAT’S CHANGING YOUR WORLD, 70 (2005).
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getting information -- a form of communicating that generated trust.  Blogs provided that 
form.31
Parallel developments were taking place during that same period which illustrated 
not only the personal and interactive nature of blogs, but also their “muscle.”  Between 
December 2002, and November 2004, the power of blogs was evidenced by one key 
event after another.  Blogs are believed to have been primarily responsible for generating 
the charges that led to the resignations of Trent Lott as U.S. Senate majority leader and 
Howard Raines as editor of The New York Times.32  Blogs became a major part of the 
2004 campaigns for president by both major political parties.  Law professor, political 
commentator, and blogger Hugh Hewitt, refers to these events as “blog swarms.”  He 
notes: “When many blogs pick up a theme or begin to pursue a story, a blog swarm 
forms.  A blog swarm is an early indicator of an opinion storm brewing, which, when it 
breaks, will fundamentally alter the general public’s understanding of a person, place, 
product, or phenomenon.”33
What factors might explain the ability of blogs to generate such immense amount 
of trust, and perhaps paradoxically, so much power?  Commentators have suggested that 
the answer lies, not in the content of blogs, but in their format.  In particular, 
commentators note four aspects of the format in which blogs are published that have 
played an important role in their fast growing influence and popularity: reverse 
chronological order, the use of “links”, their interactive nature, and low entry costs.  
31
 According to Professor Hewitt, “Most visitors to my site came because they 
believed I had something unique to offer them.  They trusted me.” See Hewitt supra note 
30 at xv. 
32 See Posner, supra note 2 at 10.
33 See Hewitt supra note 30 at 1.
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The first two features are ubiquitous.   Unlike earlier web pages, “bulletin boards” 
and “discussion groups”, the comments, or posts, appear in a blog in reverse 
chronological order.  Most recent commentary appears at the top of the blog. This simple 
format characteristic creates an expectation on the reader’s part that the blog will be 
updated regularly, and thus, that it should be visited time and time again, potentially 
several times the same day.  And the updates are expected to add value, to be important 
and timely, and thus they are placed right at the top, the first thing the reader sees when 
opening a blog.  
Value can be added in many different ways, and certainly, the posting of 
commentary, opinion and analysis is an important part of that.  Bloggers have found, 
though, a new source of value: the “link.”  A link is simply a way of pointing the readers 
to a different site.  In the 1990s as the Internet developed, the objective of commercially 
driven websites was to capture their visitors’ attention by getting them to stay on their 
websites.34  The focus was on providing comprehensive websites which included every 
possible type of information wanted by the reader.  It was common for the websites to 
prohibit the use of any external link.35  Blogs are based on precisely the opposite model.  
Blogs link to “anything and everything.”36 Thus, as somewhat counterintuitive as it may 
seem from an old-media perspective, “weblogs attract regular readers precisely because 
they regularly point readers away.”37
34 See Blood, supra note 29 at 9.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 6.
37 Id. at 19.
12
Links have thus become the blogs’ currency.  Links allow blogs to add value in 
various ways.  By linking to the sources of their commentary, the bloggers provide 
readers a context in which to place the blogger’s comments.38 By contextualizing 
information, links also generate transparency.  Links allow the reader to access the very 
sources used by the blogger, and evaluate the blogger’s interpretation and analyzes.39
The blogger’s selection of links also serves a filtering function.  Commentators argue that 
blogs represent a very useful and adept instrument in what perhaps is the key challenge 
individuals face in the information economy, i.e., to develop avenues to information that 
genuinely enhance our understanding and screen out the rest.40  Because the reader “gets 
to know” the blogger, and his or her point of view, the reader can delegate to the 
blogger’s judgment the job of keeping the reader informed.41
A third characteristic of blogs which have enabled them to concurrently generate 
considerable trust and power is their interactivity.  The technical feature that facilitates 
this function is the “comment system.”42  The comment system allows readers to 
comment on the bloggers’ posts.  The comments become part of blog, and can be 
accessed not only by the blogger, but also by other readers.  More fundamentally, 
38
 The comments posted by bloggers become just part of the communication, with 
the links, and the information they convey, providing the context.  The context could very 
well include data relevant to the issue, or other current reports on the same issue.  
Providing context, however, is likely to include previous stories. Id.
39
 The information is instantly available to the reader without any additional 
effort.  Not only can the reader evaluate the strength of the blogger’s argument, but the 
selection of links or how the blogger tries to support the argument also allows the reader 
to evaluate the blogger.  Knowing the blogger’s biases allows the reader to better 
evaluate the information being conveyed in the blog. Id.
40 Id. at 12.
41 Id. 
42 Id.
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however, the blogs invite interactivity.  Bloggers frequently invite their readers to 
comment, or to offer additional context on a particular issue.43
Finally, the quick explosion in blogs, and their corresponding power, has been in 
part fueled by the very low entry costs associated with starting a blog.   Getting a blog up 
and running is relatively easy and inexpensive.44  Once in place, the blogger is totally in 
control of the content, tone and direction of the blog.  “Suddenly” notes an article in 
Fortune Magazine, “everyone’s a publisher and everyone’s critic.”45
43
 Again, Andrew Sullivan’s experience is instructive: “In October of 2000, I 
started my fledgling site, posting pieces I had written, and then writing my own blog, 
publishing small nuggets of opinion and observation at least twice a day about this, that 
and the other.  I thought of it as a useful vanity site – and urged my friends and their 
friends to read it.  But within a couple of weeks, something odd started happening.  With 
only a few hundred readers, a few started writing back.  They picked up on my interests, 
and sent me links, ideas and materials to add to the blog.  Before long, around half the 
material on my site was suggested by readers.  Sometimes, the readers knew far more 
about any subject than I could.” See Sullivan, supra note 30.
44
 “If you own a computer or have access to a computer (at your local library, for 
example) and have an Internet connection, then you pretty much know everything you 
need to know to start a personal blog. There are a ton of blog hosting services today, and 
each of them provides easy registration, templates, and online support to guide you 
through the process of setting up a personal blog. One of the most popular blog hosts is 
LiveJournal.com. LiveJournal offers users a simple-to-use, customizable blogging tool. 
Registration at the basic level is free, but you can upgrade for a fee and gain access to a 
wider selection of tools and features.” Blog Tips, http://blog.lifetips.com/, (last visited 
March 1, 2006).
45 See David Kirkpatrick & Daniel Roth, Why There’s No Escaping the Blog, 
FORTUNE, Dec. 27, 2004, at 44.  See also, Hewitt, supra note 30 at 154 (noting that,
“Now that writers and reporters, pundits and everyone with a key board have access to 
publishing technology, there are no gates to keep, no power to say no to anyone.”)
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III. Blogs and the Stock of Social Capital
A. Social Capital
Professor Putnam in his seminal writing has noted the sharp decline in American 
social capital.  He puts it as follows: 
“For the first two-thirds of the twentieth century a powerful tide bore 
Americans into ever deeper engagement in the life of their communities, 
but a few decades ago – silently, without warning - that tide reversed and 
we were overtaken by a treacherous rip current.  Without at first noticing, 
we have been pulled apart from one another and from our communities 
over the last third of the century.”46
Numerous factors have contributed to this development including dual career 
families,47 moves to suburbia and long commute in to work,48 increased mobility and 
frequent solo travel by automobile.49  That said, there is extensive evidence that 
Americans today are less likely to belong to face-to-face civic organization, or even 
participate in informal community activities such as getting together with neighbors for 
dinner or a game of cards.50  Americans today are also less likely to vote, to attend public 
political meetings, to engage in party politics, or even to voice their views on public 
affairs.51  Moreover, it appears that this decline in community engagement has been 
accompanied by a decline in social norms of reciprocity, trust, and honesty.  People in the 
46 See Putnam, supra note 3 at 27.
47 Id. at 194-203.
48 Id. at 204-215, Extreme Commuting, supra note 11.
49 See Putnam, supra note 3 at 194-203.
50 Id. at 78.
51 Id. at 46.
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United States today trust one another less, and are more likely than in the past to engage 
in acts of incivility.52
This decline in societal connectedness or social capital has come at a cost.  The 
cooperation and coordination needed to resolve collective action53 and other problems54
is often missing.  Without the so-called “bonding” function of social capital, 
organizations may operate less efficiently, and there may be less concern for those not as 
fortunate as others.55  In addition, Americans have in many respects lost the informational 
benefits afforded by the “bridging” aspects of social capital networks.56  Put another way, 
career and other discussions over a drink at a neighborhood tavern after work are 
generally less likely to occur today than they may have in the past.57  In sum, there 
appears to be strong evidence of a significant decline in American social capital in recent 
decades, and this decline has had a marked effect on various aspects of American society.
52
 More aggressive driving habits, for example, have been cited as one example of 
this phenomenon.  Id at 142-43.
53 See Jason Mazzone, When Court Speak Social Capital and Law’s Expressive 
Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039, 1056-57 (1999)
54 See generally Robert D. Putnam, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK:  CIVIC 
TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 135-37, 167 (1994) (discussing the important social 
capital function of reducing transactions costs and letting people resolve problems 
without the need for formal contracts).
55 See Putnam, supra note 3, at 22 (noting that social capital allows individuals to 
identify the many things we share in common.)
56 Id. at 22-23. See also Mark S. Granovetter, GETTING A JOB (1974) (discussing 
the benefits of such bridging social capital networks in job-seeking).
57
 This situation, of course, is much different even today in some European 
countries like Greece with its more communal outside spaces such as sidewalk cafes. See 
“Tinelli on Leadership,” June 24, 2005, (on file with authors).
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B. The Workplace as a Place Where Social Capital is Created
In theory, the workplace should serve as an important focal point in the 
production of social capital.  The very activity of work provides a multiplicity of 
opportunities for social engagement, opportunities that are scarce in other venues of 
social interaction.58  Performing one’s job almost by definition requires individuals to 
engage in activities that form the core of social capital.  “Work itself,” notes Columbia 
Law Professor Cynthia Estlund, “involves intense social engagement, cooperation, and 
trust.”59  Work allows individuals to develop the kind of ‘civic skills’ that are so 
important in the formation of social capital.  At the workplace, notes Estlund, individuals 
are constantly practicing “skills of communication, cooperation, compromise, and 
decision making.”60
Not only is work an intensely social activity, but more Americans are 
participating in the labor force, and are also spending more time working than ever 
before.  With Americans marrying later, divorcing more, living alone more, and working 
more, there is some evidence that work has become the new center of American 
community, or that we have simply transferred “our community ties from the front porch 
to the water cooler.”61  The workplace is perhaps becoming the place where we enjoy 
most of our social interactions.  
58
 Cynthia Estlund, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN 
A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY, 30-31 (2003).
59 Id. at 30.
60 Id. 
61
 Putnam, supra note 3, at 85.  See also Estlund, supra note 58 at 30 (noting that 
the workplace is “the single most important site of cooperative interaction and sociability 
among adult citizens outside the family.”)
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Such an assertion, though, would be somewhat specious.  While certain aspects of 
the modern American workplace have encouraged social capital formation62, it seems 
these aspects have been outweighed by overall trends which mirror general societal 
developments, and have led to a decline in American workplace social capital.  Today’s 
workplace is hardly one of low risk and certainty.63  Spurred in part by U.S. free trade 
accords64 and increased technology/global communications systems, American 
manufacturing jobs have systematically been moving to lower-wage countries like 
Mexico and China.65  Moreover, “outsourcing” of work has recently become a significant 
62
 As Wharton Professor Peter Capelli has put it “[m]uch of contemporary 
American society has been built on stable employment relationships characterized by 
predictable career advancement and steady growth in wages.”  Indeed, this lack of “risk 
and uncertainty on the job” in many respects helped fuel home ownership, community 
ties and other key elements in the growth in American social capital which occurred after 
World War II. See Peter Capelli, THE NEW DEAL AT WORK! MANAGING THE MARKET-
DRIVEN RELATIONSHIP 14 (1999).  Somewhat more recent examples of managerial 
practices consistent with the social capital formation goals include, team-
based/participatory work arrangements, which have become prevalent in many 
workplaces. See CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN AND THE WORKPLACE, KENNEDY 
SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, Harvard University, www.ksg.harvard.edu/saguro/mtg6.html. 
63 See Capelli, supra note 62; Peter Capelli, Rethinking Employment, 33 BRITISH 
J. OF IND. REL. 563 (1995) (describing the new terms of the “new” employment contract); 
Charles Heckscher, WHITE COLLAR BLUES: MANAGEMENT LOYALTIES IN AN AGE OF 
CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING (1995) (describing how changes in business practices have 
altered human relations practices for managerial employees); Ken Hudson, The 
Disposable Worker, 52 MONTHLY REV. 43 (2001) (describing the employment 
relationship in the age of corporate downsizing); Paul Osterman, SECURING PROSPERITY: 
THE AMERICAN LABOR MARKET HOW IT HAS CHANGED AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
(1999) (describing the changes in the employment relationship in the post-internal labor 
market era).
64 See Leonard Bierman and Jason Campbell, Negotiating a Template for Labor 
Standards: The U.S. – Chile Free Trade Agreement, Harvard Law School, Program on 
Negotiation, 2004; Regina Abrami and Leonard Bierman, The New Tools of Trade, 83 
HARVARD BUS. REV. 26 (2005).
65 See e.g., Does the Future Belong to China, TIME MAGAZINE, May 9, 2005; John 
Lyons, CAFTA is No Cure – All for Central America, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2005 at A2, 
col. 5.
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development even in the white-collar work arena.66  Ongoing worldwide 
consolidations/mergers and acquisitions have left many enterprises and managerial 
employees without local roots.67 Companies like IBM no longer tell employees that once 
they come aboard they are members “of the corporate family for life.”68  Indeed, many 
major corporations are filling a large part of their workforce with only temporary, 
contingent, or independent contractor workers.69
The upshot of all this is that American workers have generally been feeling less 
trust and social connectedness at work than in the past.70  While they have “ties” to their 
jobs and co-workers, these ties have increasingly become what the eminent sociologist 
Professor Mark Granovetter would call “weak ties”.71  American workers no longer 
expect to have one place of employment and one general set of co-workers for life.  
Instead, they expect to have many jobs and perhaps live in many different communities 
during their lifetimes.72  As a result on their current jobs they tend to instinctively be 
66 See Stephanie Armour and Michelle Kessler, USA’s New Money – Saving 
Export: White-Collar Jobs, USA TODAY, Aug. 8, 2003.  
67 See Civic Engagement in America, supra note 62. 
68
 Putnam, supra note 3, at 13.
69 Id. at 90; Arne L. Kallenberg, Nonstandard Employment Relations: Part-time, 
Temporary, and Contingent Work, 26 ANN. REV. OF SOCIOL. 341 (2000).
70
 Putnam, supra note 3, 90-92; Civic Engagement in America, supra note 62. 
71
 Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. OF SOCIOL. 1360 
(1973). See also Mark S. Granovetter, The Impact of Social Structure and Economic 
Outcomes, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 33 (2005).
72 See generally Putnam, supra note 3, at 204 (discussing how a significant 
percentage of Americans move within a given five year period). Sharon Jayson, Wedding 
Bells Aren’t Ringing, But Neither Are Phones of Divorce Lawyers, July 18, 2005, 
(discussing the lack of commitment in American’s current relationships).
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putting their “heads down” and focusing more and more narrowly on their own job.73  Or, 
as one middle manager recently put it about his own employment:  “We’re all alone out 
here.  It’s been very stressful.”74 Thus, in many respects American workers today are 
unfortunately frequently “bowling alone”.
C. Declining Workplace Social Capital and the Law
Employees need to be able to speak out and speak to each other about working 
(and other) conditions for workplace social capital to really flourish.75  But as with other 
workplace developments,76 Putnam notes that current legal rules regarding rights of free 
speech are “to put it mildly, insecure in the workplace.”77  The source of this insecurity, 
we aver, is twofold.
First, over the last several decades, notes Putnam, the ability of employees to 
engage in speech at work free of monitoring and control has decreased considerably.78
During the last century, and for a large segment of the American labor force, labor unions 
represented the principal means with which individuals could affect the terms and 
conditions of their employment.  That is, labor unions provided employees a “voice.”79
Union organizing activities helped make employees aware of their rights under the 
73 See Putnam, supra note 3 at 88.
74 Id.
75 Id.  See also, Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 
71 IND. L. J. 101 (1996).
76 See notes 63 to 69 and accompanying text. 
77
 Putnam, supra note 3 at 92.
78 Id. at 91.
79
 See Richard Freeman & Jones Medoff, WHAT DO UNIONS DO?, 7-11 (2000).
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National Labor Relations Act80 to engage in “concerted activities” including talking to 
each other about pay and other working conditions.81  Upon winning a National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) labor certification election, unions and employers engaged in 
collective bargaining, a process which as Stanford Business School Professor Jeffrey 
Pfeffer has recently put it “institutionalizes communication between bosses and 
workers”.82  Union collective bargaining contracts acted as a check on employer 
unilateral action which might have “chilled” employee interaction, free speech, and 
communication.83
80
 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-169 (2003).
81
 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 (2003).
82
 Collective bargaining agreements between companies and unions tend to be 
quite comprehensive in nature covering a very wide range of workplace issues, including 
even explicit bans on employer race, sex and other discrimination against employees.  
These agreements generally provide employees broad opportunities to speak with each 
other and to speak out regarding working conditions.  Indeed, virtually all collective 
bargaining agreements have formal employee grievance procedures culminating in labor 
arbitration.  In addition, virtually all union collective bargaining agreements, as noted 
above, mandate that employers must show “just cause” before disciplining or firing an 
employee.  See Terry L. Leap, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING & LABOR RELATIONS, 10 
(1995).
83
 For example, on July 5, 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit held in a case involving a unionized plant of the Anheuser-Busch Beer 
Company, that the company could not unilaterally install hidden surveillance cameras in 
employee break areas.  The appeals court held that such company monitoring of 
employees was subject to collective bargaining between the company and the employee’s 
union.  Had the given Anheuser-Busch workplace been non-unionized, however, such a 
limitation on employer activity would not have existed. Brewers & Malters Loc. Union 
No. 6 v. N.L.R.B., No. 04-1278, 2005 C.A.D.C. Westlaw 1560399 (CADC  July 5, 
2005).
Similarly, while the NLRA clearly protects the right of workers in both unionized 
and non-unionized workers to talk to each other about their pay, the virtual absence of 
private sector labor unions or even the threat of such unionization has led to widespread 
ignorance of this right.  Thus today roughly one-third of U.S. employers have formal or 
informal pay secrecy/confidentiality rules, i.e., rules that under threat of discipline 
prohibit employees from talking to each other about their compensation. See Rafael Gely 
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As Professor Putnam has noted, unions, like other voluntary associations, 
historically “both created and depended upon social capital—that is, networks of 
reciprocity.”84  Today, however, for private sector workers at least, the “solidarity of 
union halls” is virtually gone.85  The precipitous decline in private sector unionization to 
currently only about 7.8 percent of the labor force,86 has led to increased employee job 
insecurity if only for the fact that traditional union collective bargaining agreement “just 
cause” protection, i.e., you can only be fired from a job for “just cause”, has been 
generally replaced by the doctrine of “employment-at-will”.87  With some caveats, this 
latter legal doctrine affords private sector employers broad rights to fire employees for 
most any reason.88
& Leonard Bierman, The Law and Economics of Employee Information Exchange in the 
Knowledge Economy, 12 GEORGE MASON L. R. 651, 684 - 85 (2004).
84 See Putnam, supra note 3, at 81
85 Id.
86 See Union Members in 2004, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Press 
Release, Jan. 27, 2005.
87 See Paul S. Gutman, Say What?: Blogging and Employment Law in Conflict, 27 
Colum. J. L. & ARTS 145 (2003) (describing the lack of legal protections available to 
employees that are terminated for blogging at work); Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong 
Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does It Matter?, 77 N. Y. U. L. REV. 6 
(2002) (describing the lack of knowledge by employees regarding their rights under the 
employment at will doctrine); Leonard Bierman and Stuart A. Youngblood, Interpreting 
Montana’s Pathbreaking Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act: A Preliminary 
Analysis, 53 MONT. L. REV. 53 (1992) (analyzing the effects of Montana’s statutory 
modification of the employment at will doctrine).
88
 The strongest exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will is the “public 
policy” exception which prevents employers from firing employees from serving on jury 
duty and engaging in other similar types of activities which clearly promote public 
policy. See Gutman, supra note 87, at 161-65; Nees v. Hock, 536 P. 2d 512, 516 (Or. 
1978). But the scope of this exception has historically been rather limited. Gutman, supra
note 87, at 161-65. It should be noted that one state in the United States, the state of 
Montana, has statutorily overruled the employment-at-will doctrine. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 
39-2-903 et seq. (2000). See infra notes 189 to 193 and accompanying text.
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Paradoxically, this period of declining unionization rates and the corresponding 
replacement of “just cause” provisions by the “at will” doctrine, has also been 
characterized by an unprecedented level of intervention at the federal level in the 
enactment of civil rights legislation starting with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,89 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,90 and more recently the American 
with Disabilities Act.91  Various scholars have pointed out that these laws, while having 
the laudable goals of protecting the rights of groups that have been for years the subject 
of abuse and discrimination, have had the unintended effect of creating what Yale Law 
Professor Vicki Schultz calls today’s “sanitized” workplace.92  In the sanitized workplace 
employers have further clamped down on worker conversations and interactions.  
Concerned about ever-increasing individual employee lawsuits, employer implementation 
of “anti-fraternization” and related policies has not been uncommon.93 Consider the 
example of harassment law.  Professor Estlund argues that current law creates an 
incentive on employers to censor a wide range of speech and limit, via “zero tolerance” 
and “anti-fraternization policies”, social interactions among their employees.  This result, 
argues Estlund, runs contrary to the goals of social capital formation.  Estlund asserts:
Given all we have learned about the importance of workplace 
conversations in civic and social life, it is deeply troubling that the law 
encourages employers to be so censorious and so vigilant in policing co-
worker conversations and interactions.  It is no answer to say – as 
89
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e17 (2003).
90
 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2003).
91
 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2003).
92
 Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L. J. 2061 (2003).
93 See Estlund, supra note 58 at 158. Indeed, the NLRB recently explicitly upheld 
an employer’s anti-fraternization policy in the case of Guardmark LLC, 344 N.L.R.B. 
No. 97 (2005).
23
defenders of harassment law sometimes do – that “the workplace is for 
work.”  As we have seen, the workplace is for much more than work, both 
in the lives of individual workers and in the society as a whole.  The law 
should not adopt as its motto a proposition that would so impoverish social 
life.”94
In sum, both directly through losing the “voice” provided through collective bargaining, 
and indirectly, through the effects of the “sanitized” workplace, the legal environment 
does not support the creation of social capital. 
IV. Blogs as a Generator of Social Capital
Do employees whose speech rights at work have been chilled simply forget about 
their concerns?  Does such employer chilling simply have no further consequences?  As 
Nobel Prize winning economist Professor George A. Akerlof has recently insightfully 
pointed out, employees that lack a sense of “community” in this regard at work will 
frequently seek alternative outlets for such community and speech.95 We contend that the 
blogosphere has become a new space where the voices of employees and other 
individuals can be heard at a very low cost, and unimpeded by the hierarchical barriers 
that sometimes are present at work and in other social settings.
Thus, it is not at all surprising that employees are increasingly turning to the 
Internet, especially blogs, to talk about work.96  Recent survey data indicates that 5
94 Id. at 158.
95 See George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Identity and the Economics of 
Organizations, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 9, 20-21 (2005).
96 See Todd Wallack, Beware if Your Blog is Related to Work, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE, Jan. 24, 2005, at C1 (noting that blogging is going “mainstream” and as it 
does millions of Americans logging details of their everyday lives, including their work
lives). 
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percent of American workers currently maintain a blog.97  Content analysis of blogs 
indicates that individuals increasingly individuals are using blogs to talk about their jobs.  
A recent study of comments posted on blogs over a six month period, found that up to 9 
percent of people posted to blogs, either others’ or their own, to comment about their jobs 
and their employers.98 Interestingly, the survey data suggests that the blogging 
employees do about their jobs, employers and coworkers, tends to be generally positive.99
This finding seems to confirm the notion that employees are increasingly looking to blogs 
as a means of creating a positive sense of social capital/community about their work.
Indeed blogs by employees appear to create the rough equivalent of what 
Professor Putnam has termed “cyberclubs” or Internet-based clubs or groups with shared 
interests.100 Blogs of this kind provide employees with low-cost opportunities to interact 
and communicate.  Moreover, they allow employees to transcend the time and space 
boundaries of the physical workplace in an open and transparent manner, and to easily 
reach all fellow employees, even those that work only on a part-time or contingent basis.  
Finally and significantly, blogs of this kind provide nearly every employee, even non-
traditional employees such as women and minorities, with generally the same “voice” as 
97 See Employment Law Alliance, Blogging and The American Workplace, 
http://www.employmentlawalliance.com/pdf/ELABloggersPoll1_31_2006.pdf.
98
 Edelman and Intelliseek, TALKING FROM THE INSIDE OUT: THE RISE OF 
EMPLOYEE BLOGGERS, 6, 7 (2005). 
99
  For example the Edelman/Intelliseek Survey finds that “the overall tone 
expressed in employee blogs is generally positive” with phrases like “love my job”, “or 
derivates outnumbering phrases like “hate my job” or derivatives by a margin of 2-to-1.  
Id. at 7.  Similarly, the Employment Law Alliance Survey found that only 16% of the 
surveyed individuals noted to have posted information that could be considered negative 
or critical regarding their employer, supervisors, co-workers, customers or clients. See 
supra note 96.
100
 See Putnam, supra note 3 at 172-73.
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those employees who have traditionally enjoyed positions of authority.101  In sum, 
employee blogs have considerable potential with respect to promoting employee free 
speech and work-related social capital.
As noted above,102 employee blogs have become the new “union hall”.
Employees can via blogs meet to discuss work-related issues and concerns, and/or to just 
socialize. Blogs give employees a new place to get together, to build trust and a sense of 
community, to even set up group dates to go bowling! As such, just as most aspects of 
union hall activities of old,103 it appears that employee blogging activities are clearly 
deserving of legal protection. Indeed, given the assertions of Professor Putnam and 
others regarding the need to reverse the precipitous decline in American social capital, 
employee blogging may be particularly deserving of legal protections.104
In this context, and as will be developed more fully below,105 it is somewhat 
ironic that the 1935 National Labor Relations Act enacted by Congress to protect private 
sector unions is the statute which technically probably provides the most legal protection 
to employee bloggers. Unfortunately and as also will be developed below,106 while the 
technical statutory language of the NLRA provides decent protection to employee 
101 Id. at 178
102 See supra notes 10 to 13 and accompanying text.
103 See Stevedoring Services of America v. Director, 297 F.3d 797 (C.A. 9, 2002) 
(dealing with the ability of the union hall to serve as an employment agency for 
employees); Wackenhut v. NLRB, (C.A. C.D., 1999) (noting that union halls can provide 
assistance to newly formed unions).
104 See supra notes 95 to 101 and accompanying text.
105 See infra notes 118 to 186 and accompanying text.
106 See infra notes 187 to 188 and accompanying text.
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bloggers, practical enforcement problems result in the NLRA being a rather weak 
platform on which employee bloggers can legally stand.
V. Employee Blogging and the National Labor Relations Act
A. Overview
For over seventy years the National Labor Relations Act has represented a major 
federal statutory exception to the common law “employment-at-will” doctrine. Not only 
does the NLRA sanction the existence of private sector labor unions and collective 
bargaining contracts which generally contain employee “just cause” and related employee 
protections,107 the Act itself directly protects employees against myriad possible adverse 
employment actions by their employers. For example, employers clearly can not fire an 
employee for union organizing activities.108
Moreover, the NLRA in section 7 provides private sector employees with some 
umbrella-like general protections for their actions. Specifically, section 7 states that 
employees have the right to engage in “concerted activity for the purpose of . . . mutual 
aid or protection.”109 Interestingly, and quite significantly, the section 7 rights apply to 
all private sector workers—unionized and non-unionized.110 Thus, for instance, the 
NLRA has been interpreted as prohibiting non-unionized employers from adopting rules 
107 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACT MANUAL, BNA 
(2005).
108 See Robert A. Gorman & Matthew W. Finkin, LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION 
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 149-154 (2004) (discussing the general contours of 
section 8(a)(1)). 
109
 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(1).
110 See Charles J. Morris, NLRB Protection in the Nonunion Workplace: A 
Glimpse at a General Theory of Section 7 Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673 (1989).
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that prohibit employees from talking to each other about their pay rates (so-called pay 
secrecy/confidentiality rules) since employee discussions of this kind have been 
uniformly interpreted by the NLRB and federal courts as constituting employee 
“concerted activity for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection.”111
Thus, to the extent employee blogging can be seen as “concerted activity” which 
is for “mutual aid or protection,” it will likely be protected by the NLRA. As a result, 
there is a high probability that to the extent employees blog to co-workers (concerted 
activity) about specific conditions of work, (mutual aid or protection) such as blogging 
will be directly and broadly protected by the Labor Act. 
As will be more fully developed below,112 however, there are important problems 
with the NLRA’s protections in this regard. First, very few employees in non-unionized 
settings have any idea that they are afforded protections under the NLRA.113 Or, as one 
legal scholar has recently put it, the application of the NLRA in non-union settings is 
“one of the best-kept secrets” of employment law.114  Second, even with respect to those 
employees that know about their rights under the NLRA, these rights are often not easy 
ones to effectively enforce,115 and the U.S. Congress has fiercely resisted amending the 
111 See Leonard Bierman and Rafael Gely, “Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? 
No Way”: Workplace Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. OF LAB. & EMPL. L. 
167, 188-89 (2004). 
112 See infra notes 187 to 188 and accompanying text.
113 See Morris, supra note 110 at 1675.
114 See William R. Corbett, Wanting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First 
Century: Everything Old is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 259, 267 
(2002).
115
“The NLRA mode of dealing with employers or unions who violate the rights 
of workers under the Act is remedial or reparative.  There are stiffer sanctions available 
to employees whose rights are violates under most federal and state employment laws.” 
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law to help improve statutory enforcement.116 Finally, even in a best case scenario, the 
NLRA only protects employee blogging to the extent such blogging involves discussions 
of working conditions/terms of conditions of employment. While the NLRB and courts 
have been fairly liberal in their interpretations of what constitutes “working conditions” 
in this regard,117 employee blogging about purely personal matters would almost surely 
fall outside the ambit of the NLRA’s protection. To the extent all employee blogging, 
even employee blogging about purely personal matters, can be seen as positively 
contributing to social capital formation, such employee blogging would appear to be 
deserving of meaningful legal protection. The NLRA does not provide such protection. 
B.  Blogs as Concerted Activity
Concerted activities are activities undertaken together by two or more 
employees,118 or by one on behalf of others.119 Thus, when two or more employees 
together lodge a complaint with a supervisor, such an activity will meet the requirement 
FACT FINDING REPORT, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONS, 73,  (May 1994).
116 See Elliot  Bredhoff, Labor Law Reform: A Labor Perspective, 20 B.C. L.R. 
27, 53-59 (1978); Andrew Kramer, Labor Law Reform: A Management Perspective, 20 
B.C. L. R. 4, 22-26 (1978).
117 See infra notes 148 to 157 and accompanying text.
118 See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (where seven 
employees who walked off their jobs to protest the cold temperatures existing at the shop
floor were found to be engaged in concerted activity).
119 See Esco Elevators, 276 NLRB 1245 (1985) (finding of concerted activity 
where union officer raised safety complaint).
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of “concert” under Section 7.120  On the other hand, when an employee in the non-
unionized workplace acting alone without consulting with fellow employees, lodges 
exactly the same complaint, the concert requirement is not met and the employee can thus 
be terminated without raising a NLRA violation.121
120 See Atlantic Pacific Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 52 F. 3d 260 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding 
concerted activity where a group of employees wrote a group letter protesting the 
selection of an un-popular co-worker as new supervisor).
121 See Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F. 2d 749 (4th Cir. 1949) (no 
concerted activity found.  Here a petition for removal of a supervisor was being 
circulated by an individual with a personal grudge against the supervisor and the 
individual was not acting for mutual aid or protection). However, it should be noted that 
there are actually some situations in which an employee acting alone might meet the 
concerted activity requirement.  The easier cases involve situations in which an 
individual employee claims a right under an existing collective bargaining agreement.  
The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), with U. S. Supreme Court approval, has 
consistently held such activity to involve concerted action. See NLRB v. City Disposal 
Systems, 465 U.S. 822 (1984). According to the NLRB, actions taken by individual 
employees intended to implement the terms of a collective bargaining agreement is “but 
an extension of the concerted activity giving rise to that agreement.” See Burney Bros. 
Constr. Co., 139 NLRB 1516 (1962). A second type of case involves those situations in 
which an individual employee claims an employment right under state or federal laws.  
Initially, the NLRB treated these cases the same as those involving individuals invoking a 
collective bargaining right.  The NLRB found the necessary link to other employees’ 
interests in the statutory mandate of the law the individual employee was seeking to 
enforce.  Accordingly, the NLRB held that “in the absence of any evidence that fellow 
employees disavow” the actions of the single employee, there was “implied consent.” See
Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 NLRB 999, 1000 (1975). Years later, though, the NLRB 
reversed this broad interpretation. In a dispute involving an employee who refused to 
drive a truck which had been involved in an accident after having complained to his 
employer and to a state transportation agency about a known defect with the truck, the 
NLRB held that concerted activity requires the individual employee to act “with or on the 
authority of” fellow workers, and not only on his or her own behalf.  The NLRB 
distinguished cases involving the assertion of a statutory right from those involving the 
assertion of a right grounded in a collective bargaining agreement.  Under this approach, 
concerted activity will only be found where an individual employee is, although acting 
alone, trying to initiate group action, or acting for or on behalf of other workers after 
having discussed the matter with fellow workers.  See Meyers Industries (Meyers I), 268 
NLRB 493 (1984), and Meyers Industries (Meyers II), 281 NLRB 882 (1986). The 
NLRB today thus generally refuses to find concerted activity where an individual 
employee acts on his or her own behalf.
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Under what conditions blogging might be considered protected concerted activity 
pursuant to the NLRA?  In order to answer this question, we need first consider the 
nature of the activity that is subject to the protected concerted classification, i.e., an 
employee posting comments in a blog about the workplace. 
Blogging can be analogized to a conversation.  At first blush, a conversation will 
clearly appear to be concerted activity.  By definition a conversation involves at least two 
individuals--the speaker and the listener. As such it appears to meet the concertedness 
requirement of Section 7.  Indeed, the NLRA and various courts have recognized for a 
long time that “a conversation may constitute concerted activity although it involves only 
a speaker and a listener.”122
However, the NLRB has, also required that “to qualify as [concerted activity] it 
must at very least appear that [the activity] was engaged in with the object of initiating or 
inducing, or preparing for group action or that [the activity] had some relation to group 
action in the interest of the employees.”123  In so holding the NLRB has been particularly 
concerned that without a requirement that the activity had the object of initiating, 
inducing, or preparing for group action, every conversation by employees would have 
come within the ambit of activities protected by the NLRA.  That view, according to the 
NLRB, would be mistaken.124
Thus, conversations present a somewhat difficult scenario in the application of the 
protected concerted activity question, and in fact have led to results characterized by a 
122 See Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB, 330 F. 2d 683 (3rd Cir. 1964).
123 Id. at 685.
124 Id.  Although it preceded Meyers (I) and (II), this view of concerted activity 
was cited approvingly by the Board in Meyers II.  Meyers (II) at 887.
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leading labor law treatise as “otherwordly.”125  While clearly involving two or more 
employees, conversations are subject to the general requirement of group action.  This 
requirement can be hard to apply in some situations, particularly given that the NLRB has 
recognized that the Section 7’s protections may “extend to concerted activity which in its 
inception involves only a speaker and a listener, for such activity is an indispensable 
preliminary step to employee self-organization.”126
Consequently, conversations could be concerted activity if they are intended to 
lead towards group action, even if group action does not immediately follow.  On the 
other hand, if the purpose of the conversation is only to “advise an individual as to what 
he could do without involving fellow workers or union representation to protect or 
improve his status or working position, it is an individual, not concerted activity, and if it 
looks forward to no action at all, it is more than likely to be mere ‘griping’.”127
The difficulties in applying these somewhat unclear standards are apparent. 
Consider the situation in Adelphi Institute Inc.,128 where an employee who had been 
placed on probation approached a co-worker and inquired if the co-worker had been ever 
placed on probation.129  The employee was terminated and then argued that her 
termination was a Section 8(a)(1) violation since her conversation with a co-worker was 
protected concerted activity.130  The NLRB found against the employee, holding instead 
125
 Robert A. Gorman & Matthew W. Finkin, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: 
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 401 (2004).
126 See Root-Carlin Inc., 92 NLRB 1313, 1314 (Cited in Meyers II at 887).
127
 Mushroom Transportation Co., at 685.
128
 287 NLRB 1073 (1988).
129 Id. at 1073.
130 Id.
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that there had not been concerted activity.  According to the majority opinion, nothing in 
the record supported the conclusion that the employee was initiating, inducing, or 
preparing for group action when she asked her co-worker if he had ever been on 
probation.131
In response to a dissenting opinion that concerted activity could be found when 
looking at the subject matter of the conversation,132 the majority reminded the dissent that 
“subject matter alone … is not enough to find concert.”133 Similarly, the majority also 
rejected the dissent’s other rationale for finding concerted activity.  According to the 
dissent it must have been the case that the employee was seeking the aid of her co-worker 
in determining the impact of probation, which according to the dissent indicated the 
concerted nature of her activity.134 The majority rejected this argument noting that the 
record was absent of any indicia that the purpose of the conversation was what the dissent 
contended.135  Thus, according to the majority, while contacting this particular co-worker 
might have been an indication of a desire to engage in group action, it was also consistent 
with a uniquely personal motive, such as inquiring if the co-worker had anything to do 
with the disciplinary action.136
Finally, the dissent and the majority disagreed as to whether the employer’s 
actions amounted to an unwritten rule banning any employee discussion relating to terms 
and conditions of employment.  The dissent argued that the employer had failed to show 
131 Id.
132 Id. at 1075.
133 Id. at 1074.
134 Id. at 1075.
135 Id. at 1074.
136 Id. at 1074.
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any legitimate and substantial business justification for the rule.137 The majority refused 
to fully consider this argument noting that the dissent’s theory was not addressed by the 
parties.138  In any event, noted the majority, it was not clear that the employer’s statement 
amounted to a rule, and further, “not every discussion of terms and conditions of 
employment constitutes protected concerted activity.”139
More recently, however, and in the context of electronic communications, the 
NLRB has interpreted employee section 7 rights more broadly than it did in Adelphi 
Institute.  Timekeeping Systems involved an unfair labor practice charge by an employee 
who was terminated after sending a lengthy email message to all the employees, 
responding to an employer’s message regarding a proposed vacation policy change.140
The email message by the employee, which according to the Board contained, “some 
flippant and rather grating language,”141 sought to prove that the proposed vacation 
policy change was not to the advantage of the employees.  The employer’s stated reason 
for terminating the employee was for the employee’s failure to treat others with courtesy 
and respect, the tone of the email, and the “ramifications of that tone.”142
In finding in favor of the employee, the Board first noted that the employee’s 
emails, “clearly ‘constitute concerted activity.”143  The Board conceded that “mere talk” 
137 Id. at 1075.
138 Id. at 1074.
139 Id.
140
 323 NLRB 244 (1997).
141
 Id. at 246.
142 Id. at 247.
143 Id. 
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amounts to concerted activity “only when it is looking toward group action.”144   The 
Board noted, however, that “the object of inducing group action need not be express.”145
The Board found that the charging employee had sent his email with the objective of 
helping others to understand the implications of the proposed vacation policy change.  
This objective, while not express, was manifested in the record.
Because of their conversation-like features, it is not entirely clear how would the 
NLRB would apply these rules to employees’ blogs.  One key characteristic which binds 
together all blogs is their format.  The posting of comments in reverse chronological 
order, the interactivity, the use of links, and the low entry costs, define to a large extent 
what blogs have become.146  This format appears to take workplace blogs a long way 
towards making the use of blogs by employees fit the concerted activity definition.147
C. Blogs as Involving Mutual Aid or Protection
In addition to finding the activity to be concerted, there must be a showing that 
the activity was for the purpose of “mutual aid or protection” before a finding of NLRA 
protected concerted activity is made.  In deciding whether the concerted activity is for 
“mutual aid or protection” the focus has been on the purpose of the employee’s action.   
144 Id.
145 Id. (reviewing authority) (emphasis added).
146 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
147
 Consider for example, both the reverse chronological order and interactive 
nature of blogs.  These two characteristics clearly define the blog as a “two-way” form of 
communication.  Bloggers post their most recent comments first as an indication that they 
are seeking to keep the reader informed of the most recent or most important 
developments.  This format invites the reader to visit the blog frequently.  Bloggers also 
expect readers to respond, by commenting on a specific post, or otherwise providing the 
blogger with links and information on a particular subject.
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The Supreme Court has clearly recognized that the “mutual aid or protection” language in 
the NLRA is intended to include activities other that those associated with self-
organization and collective bargaining (which are mentioned specifically in Section 7).148
For instance, the Court has held that section 7 covers concerted activities by employees 
“in support of employees of employers other than their own,”149 as well as encompassing 
activities by employees whose objective is “to improve terms and conditions of 
employment or otherwise improve their lot as employees through channels outside the 
immediate employee-employer relationship.”150  The Court, however, has made clear that 
while broad there are limits to the “mutual aid or protection” language of Section 7.  
According to the Court, “at some point the relationship [between the activity and the 
interests of employees as employees] becomes so attenuated that an activity cannot fairly 
be deemed to come within the ‘mutual aid or protection’ clause.”151  The “mutual aid or 
protection” requirement thus means that underlying activity must be connected to terms 
and conditions of employment. 
The NLRB, however, has been fairly liberal in defining the “mutual aid or 
protection” language.152  For example, the NLRB has protected employees’ protests 
148 See Eastex Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978) (distribution of newsletter 
containing discussion of right-to-work legislation and minimum wage federal legislation 
protected activity).
149 Id. at 564.
150 Id. at 565.
151 Id. at 567-68.  The Court left the task of delineating the extent of the “mutual 
aid or protection” clause to the Board.
152 See generally, Patrick Hardin & John E, Higgins, Jr., THE DEVELOPING LABOR 
LAW, 184-88 (2001).
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regarding the discharge or appointment of supervisory personnel.153 The NLRB has found 
that where the decision regarding supervisory changes are likely to adversely affect the 
employees’ working conditions, the employees’ protest is for “mutual aid or 
protection.”154 Similarly, the Board held that a group of engineers, who wrote a letter to 
several legislators expressing their opposition to changes in immigration laws that could 
affect the supply of engineers in the U.S., were engaged in protected activity even though 
the employer did not have direct control over the employees’ concerns.155
Whether an employee terminated for blogging will be able to establish the 
protected nature of his or her activity, thus, appears to depend to a very large extent on 
the content of the message the employee is sending.  An employee like Steve Olafson, a 
reporter for The Houston Chronicle, who was fired from his job for writing in his blog 
about the local politicians that he covered as a newspaper reporter probably would not be 
protected under the NLRA.156  Mr. Olafson, who blogged under the name of “Banjo 
Jones,” frequently ridiculed the same subjects about whom he was profiling in his 
Chronicle columns.157  His comments appeared to be very tenuously related to the 
153
 Bob Evans Farms v. NLRB, 116 F. 3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998).  Cf. Joanna Cotton 
Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F. 2d 749) (4th Cir. 1949) (holding that circulating a petition for 
removal of a supervisor was not protected activity when a particular individual when the 
motivation for the petition was a personal dispute with a specific supervisor).
154
 Bob Evans v. NLRB, 116 F. 3d at 1014.
155 See Kaiser Engineers, 213 NLRB 752 (1974).
156 See Richard Connelly, Banjo Blues: A Chronicle Writer Gets Canned for 
Running a Web Site, August 8, 2002, HOUSTON PRESS.
157
 In his blog, for example, he referred to a local state senator, as “the state 
senator with the Hair Club for Men wig” and referred to a local council which had 
problems complying with a request for information disclosure, as a “Taliban-like Nest of 
Lawbreakers.”  Id. 
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interest of other employees as employees, and thus likely outside the protection of 
Section 7.  
D. Blogs as Abusive, Insubordinate, or Disloyal Conduct
The Board and courts interpreting the NLRA have also found that otherwise 
protected activity might lose its protection by being abusive, insubordinate, or disloyal.  
The leading case on this issue is NLRB v. IBEW Local 1229 (Jefferson Standards).158  In 
that case, the U. S. Supreme Court found that a handbill distributed by employees that 
were involved in a negotiating dispute regarding the renewal of an arbitration provision 
in which the employees sharply criticized the quality of the employer’s product was not 
protected activity.  According to the Court, the employees’ actions were disloyal.  Since 
“the legal principle that insubordination, disobedience or disloyalty is adequate cause for 
discharge is plain enough”, the Court found that the employer’s decision to terminate the 
employees who had distributed the handbill was not a violation of the NLRA.
The Jefferson Standards holding has proven to be highly controversial.  As the 
dissenting opinion by Justice Frankfurter noted, most types of concerted activities could 
be considered to be “disloyal.”159  Accordingly, later cases have limited the potential 
applicability of Jefferson Standards.  The Ninth Circuit decision in Sierra Publishing Co. 
v. NLRB is illustrative.160  In ordering the reinstatement of a group of newspaper editorial 
employees who were fired for writing a letter to the newspaper’s advertisers criticizing 
the paper’s operations, the court noted:
158
 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
159 Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting opinion)
160
 889 F. 2d 210 (1989).
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“[T]he disloyalty standard is at base a question of whether the employees' 
efforts to improve their wages or working conditions through influencing 
strangers to the labor dispute were pursued in a reasonable manner under 
the circumstances. Product disparagement unconnected to the labor 
dispute, breach of important confidences, and threats of violence are 
clearly unreasonable ways to pursue a labor dispute. On the other hand, 
suggestions that a company's treatment of its employees may have an 
effect upon the quality of the company's products, or may even affect the 
company's own viability are not likely to be unreasonable, particularly in 
cases when the addressees of the information are made aware of the fact 
that a labor dispute is in progress. Childish ridicule may be unreasonable, 
while heated rhetoric may be quite proper under the circumstances. Each 
situation must be examined on its own facts, but with an understanding 
that the law does favor a robust exchange of viewpoints. The mere fact 
that economic pressure may be brought to bear on one side or the other is 
not determinative, even if some economic harm actually is suffered. The 
proper focus must be the manner by which that harm is brought about.”161
In addition to the disloyalty cases, employees’ otherwise protected activities have 
been challenged for being abusive and insubordinate.  The Board has found that some 
concerted activity can be expressed in so intolerable manner as to lose the protection of 
Section 7.  While unpleasantries uttered in the course of otherwise protected activity do 
not generally “strip away the Act’s protection,”162 the Board has declined to invoke the 
Act’s protection where the concerted behavior has been truly insubordinate or disruptive 
of the work process.”163
161 Id. at 219.
162
 Timekeeping Systems, at 249.
163
 Will & Baumer Candle Co., 206 NLRB 772 fn. 1 (1973). Thus, for example, in 
a case where an employee designed and sent to a manager a cartoon for a T-shirt 
suggesting someone with low intelligence as a protest to the manager’s alleged statement 
at a NLRB hearing, the Fifth Circuit found the employee’s behavior to be protected 
activity.   The court agreed with the NLRB’s characterization of the employee’s action as 
a “mildly sarcastic response” to the manager’s statement.  According to the court, the 
employee’s statements were “not fraught with malice, obscene, violent, extreme or 
wholly unjustified.” Reef Industries v. NLRB, 952 F. 2d 830, 837 (1991). However, in a 
case involving a “mocking letter” prepared by two employees about free ice cream 
supplied by the employer in appreciation of a new contract with a supplier, the Fourth 
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This issue of disloyalty and insubordination is likely to be a critical one regarding 
the application of NLRA protections to employee bloggers.  The very nature of blogs as a 
spontaneous form of communication is likely to result in language and comments which 
at times push the envelope in terms of what may be considered to be appropriate 
workplace etiquette.  For instance, some of the early workplace bloggers were rather 
direct and blunt.  The comments of Amy Norah Burch, a former secretary at Harvard
University, are illustrative: “Work is aggravating me.  I am one shade lighter than 
homicidal today.  I am two snotty e-mails from professors away from bombing the entire 
Harvard campus.”164 Adding to the abrasive nature of these comments, Burch referred to 
her supervisors by first name, and commented on their “random freaking out” and “anal 
retentive control freakishness.”165 However, NLRA caselaw makes clear that the 
threshold for losing section 7’s protections is rather high.  The Board has refused to 
disqualify from statutory protection language characterizing acting supervisors as “a-
holes,”166 a letter describing management with such words as “hypocritical,” “despotic,” 
and “tyrannical,”167 and even a statement to other employees describing the chief 
Circuit refused to find the activity to be protected.  According to the court, although 
“criticisms of working conditions by satiric letters or other conduct can be protected 
activity”, the letter was not intended to “enlist the support and assistance of other 
employees for the purpose of correcting what the workers thought to be an inadequacy in 
working conditions.”  The court characterized the employees’ intent as “belittling the 
company’s gesture” and not in any way “intended to resolve or call attention to 
conditions of employment.” New River Industries v. NLRB, 945 F. 2d 1290, 1295 
(1991).
164 See Leon Neyfakh, Online Weblog Leads to Firing, THE HARVARD CRIMSON 
ONLINE EDITION, May 26, 2004, 
http://www.thecrimson.com/printerfrindly.aspx?ref=502702.
165 Id.
166
 Postal Service, 241 NLRB 389 (1979).
167
 Harris Corp., 269 NLRB 733 (1984).
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executive officer as a “cheap son of a bitch.”168  Courts have recognized that employees 
engaging in Section 7 activity may acceptably also engage in some “impropriety,”169 and 
thus Section 7 protection will be lost only if the questioned activity is “of such serious 
character as to render the employee unfit for further service.”170
E. Employers’ Interests Under the NLRA
If an employee’s blogging activities are clearly NLRA protected, the issue then 
becomes whether the employer can advance a “legitimate and substantial business 
justification” for disciplinary action against such activities.171  In making this 
determination the NLRB will apply a “balancing test” to determine whether the 
employees’ section 7 rights outweigh the employer’s business justification.172  If 
employers are challenged under the NLRA for disciplining or terminating a blogger, or 
even for establishing a policy limiting the rights of employees to blogs, one can expect 
them to possibly raise at least two rebuttal arguments.
First, employers could potentially make a confidentiality argument.  The NLRB 
has found a legitimate business justification to exist in cases where employees have been 
disciplined for disclosing information that the employer deemed confidential.  For 
example, in International Business Machines Corp.,173 the employer required all 
employees to sign upon their hire an agreement not to disclose to anyone outside the 
168
 Churchill’s Restaurant, 276 NLRB 775 (1985).
169
 Timekeeping Systems at 249.
170
 Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co, 554 F. 2d 320 329 (7th Cir. 1976).
171 Id.
172 Id.
173
 265 NLRB 638 (1982).
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company, or use in other than company business, any confidential information.174  This 
rule prohibited the distribution of wage data that the employer had compiled and 
classified as confidential.175  An employee was terminated after he had distributed to 
other employees salary information that he had received in the course of his 
employment.176  In upholding the discharge, the NLRB noted that the employee knew 
that the documents at the center of the disclosure had been classified as confidential, and 
that he had no reason to believe that their dissemination was authorized.  
Similarly, in K-Mart & United Food And Commercial Workers Union, Local 
870,177 the NLRB found that a rule which appeared in the employee handbook providing 
that company business and documents were considered to be confidential and prohibiting 
disclosure of such information did not constitute a section 8(a)(1) violation.178 The NLRB 
did not find that such a rule was likely to “chill” employees’ rights by requiring 
employees who wish to discuss information about employment terms and conditions to 
risk discipline or in the alternative to forgo their Section 7 rights. The NLRB instead 
concluded that the rule found in the employee manual “would likely be reasonably 
understood by employees not as restricting discussion of terms and conditions of 
employment but, rather, as intended to protect solely the legitimate confidentiality of the 
[employer’s] private business information.”179
174 Id. at 641.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177
 330 NLRB 263 (1999).
178 Id. at 263.
179 Id. at 623-24.
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Second, employers might also argue that a prohibition against blogging could be 
justified in order to maintain order and discipline in the workplace.  The NLRB, and 
reviewing courts, have given employers some leeway “to maintain production, reduce 
employee dissension or distractions from work, or maintain employee safety and 
discipline,”180 particularly in the context of issuing non-solicitation workplace rules.  
Thus, for example, rules prohibiting solicitation during working time have been found to 
be presumptively valid on the grounds that they are necessary to maintain safety and 
efficiency.181  On similar grounds, the Board has sustained company rules that bar 
distribution of literature in working areas at all times.182 According to the Board, a “no-
distribution” rule is justified because the distribution of union literature in working areas 
could result in a littering hazard, which in turn is likely to have negative impact on 
productivity.183
The leeway given to employers regarding non-solicitation and non-distribution 
rules, however, is not absolute.  For example, the Board and reviewing courts have 
refused to allow employers to ban the wearing by employees of union pins, buttons and 
insignias while on the job.  The United States Supreme Court has held that employees 
have a presumptive right to wear, for example, a union insignia, unless the employer is 
able to establish that a special circumstance exist which justify banning such insignia.184
Such a special circumstance can be established by a showing that the employers’ 
180
 Meijer v. NLRB, 130 F. 3d 1209, 1213 (1997).
181
 Republic Aviation v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
182
 Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 615 (1962).
183 Id.
184
 Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 803-04.
43
restriction is necessary “to maintain production, reduce employee dissension or 
distractions from work, … maintain employee safety and discipline,… [or where] the 
employer makes an affirmative showing that the union insignia that the employee seeks 
to wear will negatively impact a certain public image that the employer seeks to 
protect.”185  For example, an employer might argue that the comments such as those
posted by Rachel Mosteller, referring to the “stupid little awards that are supposed to 
boost company morale,”186 could create tension among employees and supervisors, as 
well as among employees.  These types of comments, employers could argue, are in no 
way constructive, and could potentially lead to severe conflict among employees.  Thus, 
to the extent employers aver that employee blogs involve proprietary workplace 
information or that a prohibition of such blogging is clearly necessary to maintain 
workplace order and discipline, they may be able to outlaw what would otherwise by 
NLRA-protected employee blogging activity. 
F. Summary
In sum, the NLRA does appear to offer considerable legal protection to employee 
bloggers whose blogging is of a work-related nature. A lot of such blogging is likely to 
185
 Meijer v. NLRB, 130 F. 3d at 1217.
186 Rachel Mosteller is the reporter for the Herald Sun, a North Carolina’s 
newspaper, who alleges to have been terminated for complaining in her blog about the 
“stupid little awards” being given at work to boost company morale. See Amy Joyce, 
When Blogging Gets Risky, Bad Mouthing Job Leads to Firings, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 
2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6949377/.  In February 2004, Mosteller wrote in 
her blog: “I really hate my place of employment… they have these stupid little awards 
that are supposed to boost company morale… so you go and do something ‘spectacular’ 
(most likely, you’re doing your JOB) and then someone says ‘Why golly, that was 
spectacular,’ then they sign your name on some paper, they bring you chocolate and some 
balloons…. Id.
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fall within the ambit of that statute’s “concerted activity” and “mutual aid or protection” 
coverage. It is important to point out, though, that the NLRA’s section 7 “concerted” 
requirement does appear to generally exclude employee blogging involving individual
work-related complaints or claims. Employer disciplinary interests may also trump 
employee section 7 protections where, for example, the employee’s blog contains 
arguably confidential or proprietary information.  Moreover, and as noted above,187 while 
the NLRA’s protection of employee blogging clearly covers both unionized and non-
unionized American workers, it appears that non-unionized workers generally have little 
knowledge of such protection.188 In addition, effective enforcement has been a problem 
under the NLRA even for those employees clearly covered by its protections. Finally, and 
most significantly, the NLRA clearly does not protect employees whose blogging is non-
work related. Protection may exist for such employees, however, under state rather than 
federal law.
VI. State Law Protections for Bloggers
A. State Common Law
As discussed earlier,189 the basic common law rule governing employment in the 
United States today is that of employment-at-will. Or, as the Tennessee Supreme Court 
put it in the classic case of Payne v. Western & Atlantic Railroad190 employers are free to 
187 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
188 Id..
189 Under the employment-at-will rule, an employer may dismiss an at-will 
employee at any time for a good reason, a bad reason, or for no reason at all.  See 
generally, Henry H. Perritt, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE, 4th Ed. 3 (1998).
190 81 Tenn. 507, 523, 526-27 (1884).
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“discharge or retain employees at-will for good cause or for no cause, or for even bad 
cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act.191 To date, only one state in the 
nation, Montana, has statutorily altered this construct by enacting the Montana Wrongful 
Discharge from Employment Act192 which gives all employees in the state protection 
from discharge without “just cause”.193
State court judges, though, in virtually every state in the country, have during the 
past three decades been actively creating judicial exceptions to the employment-at-will 
doctrine.194 Of particular possible relevance to employee bloggers are the judicially 
created “implied contract” and “public policy” exceptions.
Under the implied-contract exception, representations made by employers 
regarding job security, disciplinary procedures, and other employee privileges have been 
treated by state courts as enforceable provisions even in the absence of an express 
employment contract.195 Employees raising this exception have relied on employee 
191 For a historical discussion of the development of the doctrine see Jay M. 
Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. OF LEGAL 
HISTORY 118 (1976).
192 See Mont. Code Ann. §§ 39-2-901-39-2-914.
193 Section 4 of the Montana statute provides that, “A discharge is wrongful only 
if: (1) it was in retaliation for the employee’s refusal to violate public policy or for 
reporting a violation of public policy; (2) the discharge was not for good cause and the 
employee had completed the employer’s probationary period of employment; or (3) the 
employer violated the express provision of its own written personnel policy.”
194 Our treatment of the employment-at-will doctrine here is limited to its 
application to employees that suffered adverse employment consequences because of 
their blogging activities.  The literature on the at-will doctrine is extensive and rich.  For 
a doctrinal overview of the doctrine See generally Perritt supra note 189.
195 See Mark A. Rothstein et al., EMPLOYMENT LAW, 2nd Ed. 671-94 (1999). The 
implied contract exception includes both cases based on written or oral communications, 
see, e.g., Chiodo v. General Waterworks Corp., 413 p. 2d 891 (Sup. Ct. Utah 1967) 
(finding that a contract for a specific time period included implied terms that employee 
would conform to the usual standards of performance); Wooley v. Hoffman-La Roche, 
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manuals/handbooks and oral statements made by supervisory personnel as the contractual 
basis for an implied promise of some form of job security.196 Thus, to the extent 
employers have set forth general policies regarding employee blogging in employee 
handbooks or other materials, state courts may find these policies to be binding on 
employers, even if they don’t formally constitute contracts between the employer and 
employee.197 With blogging still in its nascent stages, however, employer guidelines of 
this kind are not all that common,198 minimizing the possible protection afforded 
employees under the implied-contract exception.
The public policy exception involves situations in which the termination of the 
employee contravenes some explicit, well-established public policy.199  Initially, the 
public policy exception focused on protecting employees who were fired for engaging in 
behavior which directly benefited the public welfare.  For example, courts protected 
Inc., 491 A. 2d 1257, modified 499 A. 2d 515 (Sup. Ct. NJ 1985) (finding that absent a 
clear and prominent disclaimer, an implied promise contained in an employment manual 
that an employee will be fired only for cause may be enforceable against an employer 
even when the employment is for an indefinite term); and cases based on conduct, see, 
e.g., Grouse v. Group Health Plan Inc., 306 N.W. 2d 114 (Sup. Ct. Minn. 1981) (holding 
that the doctrine of promissory estoppel allows a plaintiff to sue employer who withdrew 
job offer after plaintiff had accepted, but before plaintiff had began job).
196 See e.g., Small v. Spring Indus., 357 S. E. 2d 452, 454-55 (S.C. 1987) (noting 
that it would be unfair to allow employers to treat statements of this kind as gratuitous or 
nonbinding).
197 See Armour & Kessler, supra note 66.
198 According to one survey, nearly 70 percent of companies have no policies 
regarding employees bloggers, see Edelman & Intelliseek Survey, supra note 98. 
However, companies are certainly becoming increasingly aware of the importance of 
blogs, Wal-Mart Enlists Bloggers in P.R. Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, March 7, 2006, at C1. 
(describing Wal-Mart’s efforts to enlist employees as bloggers in their aggressive public 
relations campaign). 
199 See e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (S.Ct. Or. 1975) (finding a violation of 
public policy in a case involving an employee who was discharge for jury service).
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employees who had been fired for serving on jury duty or refusing to follow orders to 
commit an illegal act.   
Recently, plaintiff’s lawyers have attempted to expand the reach of the public 
policy exception.  In particular, the public policy exception, it has been argued, should 
apply not only in those narrow situations in which an employee is fired for performing a 
civic duty, but also in cases in which employers were engaging in actions that encroached 
on employees’ personal autonomy.  This argument has been especially raised regarding 
employer efforts to limit the off-duty activities of employees with regard to employees’ 
political activities,200 personal relationships,201 and behavior and lifestyle outside of 
work.202  The approaches the courts have developed in each of these areas provide some 
insight into how state courts might look at similar types of challenges by employees who 
are terminated because of their blogging activities.  
In a number of cases employees have argued that their decisions to participate (or 
not participate) in specific political activities have been the basis for their terminations, 
and thus, claimed that the terminations are contrary to public policy.  In general, 
employees making this argument have argued that the public policy in favor of free 
200 See, Rothstein, et al., supra note 195.  See also, Bell v. Faulkner, 75 S.W.2d 
612 (Mo. App. 1934) (finding against an employee who was discharge for refusing to 
vote or campaign for certain candidates favored by the employer).
201
 Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241 (1984) (finding in favor of 
plaintiff on various grounds where the employer fired the plaintiff for her off-duty dating 
activities).
202
 Brunner v. Al Attar, 786 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. App. 1990) (upholding lower court 
decision against employee who was terminated for her volunteering off-duty work with 
an AIDS foundation).
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speech, as found in the federal or corresponding state constitution, was violated by the 
employer’s action.203
For example, this argument was successfully raised in the case of Novosel v. 
Nationwide Ins. Co.,204  where the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
found an insurance company to have acted illegally when it fired an employee for 
refusing to lobby the Pennsylvania House of Representatives in support of a company 
sponsored piece of insurance reform legislation.  According to the court, the key question 
was “whether a discharge for disagreement with the employer’s legislative agenda or a 
refusal to lobby the state legislature on the employer’s behalf sufficiently implicates a 
recognized facet of public policy.”205  The court answered this question affirmatively, 
noting that “the protection of an employee’s freedom of political expressions would 
appear to involve no less compelling a societal interest than the fulfillment of jury service 
or the filing of a worker’s compensation claim.”206
A second type of off duty conduct that has been raised in wrongful discharge 
against public policy cases relates to employees’ dating practices.  In these cases courts 
have generally sided with employers, especially where supervisor-subordinate 
relationships were involved, and have been wary of employee attempts to argue 
discharges of this kind are in any way violative of "public policy".  Thus, in a case 
involving the discharge of an employee for bringing a woman other than his wife to an 
203
 Chavez v. Manville Products Corp., 777 P.2d 371 (S.Ct. N.M. 1989) (finding 
that alleged oral representations made to employee could not create enforceable 
contractual obligations.)
204
 721 F.2d 894 (3rd Cir. 1983).
205 Id. at 899.
206 Id. 
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employer banquet, a court explicitly rejected employee arguments regarding "freedom of 
association".   The court held that the right to associate with a non-spouse at an employer 
banquet was not a threat to a recognized aspect of public policy of the kind which merited 
an exception to the traditional doctrine of employment-at-will.207  Similarly, an Illinois 
court refused to overturn an employer's decision to terminate an employee for marrying a 
co-worker on the basis that the state's interest in promoting marriage created a "public 
policy" exception to the at-will doctrine.208  Finally, in the case of Patton v. J. C. Penney 
Co., the Supreme Court of Oregon directly held that the employment-at-will doctrine 
gave the retailer the right to fire an employee for dating a co-worker, and that any 
interference with the employee's "personal lifestyle" in this regard did not "trigger the 
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine."209
Employees have been equally unsuccessful when challenging adverse 
employment actions based on other aspects of their private life, such as their behavior 
and lifestyles.  For example, in Graebel v. American Dynate Corporation,210 the plaintiff 
was fired after a local newspaper’s article “memorialized [the employee’s] racially-biased 
attitudes and opinions regarding the effect of the increased Asian immigration” in the 
207
 Staats v. Ohio National Life Insurance Co., 620 F. Supp. 118 (DC Pa. 1985).
208
 McCluskey v. Clark Oil and Refining Co., 147 Ill. App. 3d 822 (Ill. 1 Dist. 
1986).
209
 Patton v. J. C. Penney Co., 719 P.2d 854 (S.Ct. Or. 1986).  In one isolated but 
prominent case involving the IBM Corporation, however, a California court did overturn 
the discharge of an employee for having a romantic relationship with an employee at a 
rival office products firm. The plaintiff in Rulon-Miller v. International Business 
Machines Com., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241 (1984), was terminated for dating an ex-employee.  
The California Court of Appeals ruled IBM's discharge of her to be unlawful.  While 
acknowledging the traditional doctrine of employment-at-will, the court's decision 
interestingly turned almost solely on two internal IBM policy documents.
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 604 N.W.2d 35, 1999 WL 693460 (1999) (unpublished disposition).
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local area.  The plaintiff argued that his termination “for speaking from the confines of 
his home on a matter of public concern unrelated to his employment” constituted a 
wrongful discharge in violation of the state constitution and the common laws of the 
state.211  In finding against the employee, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals noted the very 
narrow nature of the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine.212  While recognizing 
the “importance of one’s free speech rights,”213 the court refused “to include an 
employee’s complaint that he was discharged as a result of oral or written complaints 
made concerning some matter that is related to a public policy,” concluding then, that 
“the public policy exception may not be used to extend constitutional free speech 
protection to private employment.”214
The Idaho Supreme Court recently reached a similar result in the case of Edmoson 
v. Shearer Lumber Products.215  The plaintiff, an employee at a lumber mill, was 
terminated after making public statements criticizing a project involving his employer 
and a local civic group regarding the managing of a local national forest.  The plaintiff 
argued that he had been wrongfully terminated because he exercised his constitutionally 
protected rights of free speech and association.  The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the 
summary judgment finding against the employee, clearly indicating that “an employee 
does not have a cause of action against a private sector employer who terminates the 
211 Id. at ***1.
212 Id. at  ***5.  In particular, under Wisconsin law the court noted, the exception 
is limited to cases covering “an employee’s refusal to obey his or her employer’s 
command to violate public policy as established by: (1) statutory or constitutional 
provision; (2) the spirit of a statutory provision; or (3) administrative rules.
213 Id. at  ***5.
214 Id.
215
 75 P.3d 733 (2003).
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employee because of the exercise of the employee’s constitutional right of free 
speech.”216
A few courts, though, have been willing to entertain the argument that an 
employer action which limits the employees’ freedom of speech and association might 
serve as the basis for a wrongful discharge claim.  Even when the courts have entertained 
the argument, however, plaintiffs have generally been unsuccessful.  
Wiegand v. Motiva Enterprises, LLC is illustrative.217  In Wiegand, the plaintiff 
was a Texaco gas station supervisor who operated a website that sold Neo-Nazi 
paraphernalia.218  Wiegand began working for Texaco in 1994.219  Upon being hired, he 
received and signed an employee handbook that indicated his at-will employee status.220
In 1999, Wiegand informed his immediate supervisor that he sold “non-mainstream CDs 
and flags,” but the supervisor did not look into Wiegand’s activities because Wiegand’s 
work was not affected.221  In addition, his supervisor claimed he “did not care about what 
plaintiff [Wiegand] did in his free time.”222  Two years later, the website was revealed in 
two newspaper articles.223  Although the newspaper articles did not reveal where 
216 Id. at 739.
217
   295 F. Supp.2d 465 (2003).
218
 Items sold in Wiegand’s website included “‘underground music and records’ 
that are ‘racist and/or offensive to some people,’ such as swastika flags, music advertised 
as ‘the most popular and funniest Nigger-hatin’ songs ever written’ and t-shirts with 
sayings like ‘Skinheads’ and ‘Blue-Eyed Devil.’” Id.
219 Id. at 467. 
220 Id.  
221 Id.
222 Id. at 468.
223 Id.  
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Wiegand worked,224 he was soon terminated because Texaco deemed Wiegand’s actions 
as “violat[ing] the company’s ‘core value’ of ‘respect for all people.’”225
Wiegand challenged his termination arguing that his employer could not terminate 
his employment because of his right to exercise free speech.  Wiegand alleged that “an 
employee, whether public or private, should not have to be fearful about expressing his 
personal views in his own home, on his own time.  He should not have to worry about 
losing his job because of his exercise of his first amendment rights in such a private 
manner that does not affect his employer.”226  The United States District Court in New 
Jersey noted that under New Jersey law, at-will employees “may sustain a claim for 
wrongful termination if [they] can show [their] discharge was ‘contrary to a clear 
mandate of public policy.’”227  The court also noted that matters of public policy are 
determined from both United States and state constitutions, federal, state, and 
administrative rules and regulations, and common law.228
The court, however, found against the plaintiff.   According the court, Wiegand 
had failed to establish that the employer’s termination decision was contrary to a clear 
mandate of public policy, since the plaintiff’s speech was not clearly protected by the 
First Amendment due to its nature as commercial hate speech.229
224 Id. at 469.
225 Id. at 466.
226 Wiegand, 295 F.Supp.2d at 474.  
227 Id. at 473 citing Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72 (1980).  
228 Wiegand, 295 F.Supp.2d at 473 citing MacDougall v. Weichert, 144 N.J. 380, 
391 (1996).
229 Wiegand, 295 F. Supp. at 475.
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In sum, employee bloggers are also likely to enjoy rather limited protection under 
the public policy exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will. Historically, state 
courts have permitted this exception only where private sector employee speech clearly 
touches on matters of “public concern”.230 This has, as Cornell Law School Dean 
Stewart J. Schwab has noted, resulted in a rather narrow application of this legal 
exception.231 As a result, employee bloggers are unlikely to find much legal protection in 
this regard.
B. State Statutory Protections
While state courts have been rather hesitant to find ways of protecting employees 
against adverse employment actions taken as the result of the employees’ off-duty 
conduct, legislatures in various states have been more forceful.  In the late 1980's the 
tobacco industry began aggressively lobbying state legislatures to pass laws protecting 
the rights of employees and prospective employees to smoke while off-duty.  In various 
of these states, however, the narrow nature of the proposed legislation, i.e., simply 
protecting the rights of smokers, drew sharp opposition.232
Consequently, in a number of states the proposed legislation was broadened to 
protect employee/prospective employee use of "lawful products" or "lawful consumable 
230
 Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (S.Ct. Or. 1975).
231 See Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for Third-
Party Effects, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1957-58 (1996).
232 See Marisa A. Pagnattaro, What Do You Do When You Are Not At Work? 
Limiting the Use of Off-Duty Conduct as the Basis For Adverse Employment Decisions, 6 
U. PENN. J. LAB & EMP. L. 625, 641 (2004).  See also, Jackson, supra note 21 at 145. 
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products" during non-work hours away from employer premises.233  In such states, for 
example, an employer could not discharge an employee for his or her vacation-time 
consumption of alcohol. Moreover, the state legislatures in three states, Colorado,234 New 
York,235 California, 236and North Dakota,237 have gone even a step further protecting not 
only employee off-duty use of lawful products (tobacco, alcohol, etc.) but also providing 
protection against employee discharge for or "lawful activities" off the employer's 
premises during non-working hours.  In total, over thirty states have passed legislation 
protecting the off-duty rights of employee smokers, and of these, about seven states have 
gone a step further protecting employee off-duty use of all lawful products, while the 
aforementioned four states have gone two steps further providing protections for 
employees with regard to all off-duty lawful activity.238
Moreover, considerable differences exist among the statutes in the four states 
which broadly protect all lawful employee off-duty conduct. The Colorado statute, for 
example, appears to only protect current employees from termination,239 while the 
statutes in New York, California, and North Dakota240 appear to protect both job 
233 See Jackson, supra note 21 at 144.
234
 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402.5 (1995).
235
 N.Y. Lab. Law § 201-D (1996).
236
 Cal. Lab. Code § 96 (k) (2002).
237
 N. Dakota Cent. Code § 14.02.4-03 (1995).
238
 Terry Morehead Dworkin, It’s My Life – Leave Me Alone: Off-The-Job 
Employee Associational Privacy Rights, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 47 (1997).
239 See Col. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402.5.
240 See N.Y. Lab. Law § 201(d); Cal. Lab. Code § 96 (k); N. Dakota Cent. Code §
14.02. 4-03.
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applicants and employees from any adverse employment action or “discrimination” (e.g., 
demotion, transfer, and failure to hire/promote) due to their lawful off-duty conduct.
In addition, the afore-mentioned four states have different provisions regarding 
“conflict of interest” exemptions from statutory coverage. The North Dakota statute, for 
example, explicitly protects employee “lawful activity off of the employer’s premises 
during nonworking hours” so long as this activity is not in “direct conflict with the 
essential business-related interests of the employer.”241 In contrast, the Colorado statute 
does not apply if the employee’s off-duty activities present a “conflict of interest” or “the 
appearance of . . . a conflict of interest”.242 Thus, employees blogging off-duty currently 
appear to enjoy broader protection for their blogging activities in North Dakota than in 
Colorado. 
Finally, the enforcement schemes of the four broad statutes vary markedly. The
Colorado statutes specifically states that the “sole remedy” for aggrieved individuals 
under its off-duty conduct statute is a civil lawsuit in state district court for lost wages 
and benefits, although such aggrieved individual is explicitly required by the statute “to 
mitigate his damages”.243 The relevant North Dakota statute, in contrast, is embedded in 
the state’s Human Rights Act which is enforced by the Human Rights Division of the 
North Dakota Department of Labor.244 The remedies under the North Dakota law appear 
241
 N. Dakota Cent. Code § 14.02.4-03.
242
 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402.5 (1) (b). The Colorado law also gives employers 
the right to restrict employee lawful activity if it [r]elates to a bona fide occupational 
qualification, among other things. See Id. at 24-34-402.5 (1) (a).
243
 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402.5 (2) (a).
244 See N. Dakota Code Chapter § 14-02-4 (1995). See also How To File A 
Discrimination Complaint in North Dakota, Human Rights Division, North Dakota 
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to include wide-ranging equitable relief, including injunctions.245 In addition, the North 
Dakota Human Rights Division, similar to the approach taken by the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in enforcing Title VII of the U.S. Civil 
Rights Act,246 places considerable emphasis on using alternative despite resolution 
methods, especially mediation/conciliation, in resolving complaints brought under the 
North Dakota Human Rights Act.247
The New York State off-duty activities statute is actually embedded in a law 
giving that state’s Labor Commissioner the power to regulate workplace health and 
safety.248 Consequently, it appears that the New York law is enforced in significant 
measure by means of having the state Labor Commissioner impose monetary fines on 
employers for statutory violations.249 Finally, California’s employee off-duty conduct 
law is part of that state’s wage and hour laws, with the California Labor Commissioner 
empowered to help employees collect “loss of wages” resulting from adverse employer 
Department of Labor, www.nd.gov/labor/services/humanrights (last visited March 1, 
2006).
245 Id.
246 According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission website:
Mediation is a fair and efficient process to help you resolve your 
employment disputes and reach an agreement. A neutral mediator 
assists you in reaching a voluntary, negotiated agreement. 
Choosing mediation to resolve employment discrimination 
disputes promotes a better work environment, reduces costs and 
works for the employer and the employee.
http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/index.html (last visited, March 1, 2006).
247 See How To File a Discrimination Complaint, supra note 179.
248 See N.Y. Labor code § 200.
249 Id. at §§ 201-d, 211 & 213.
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action due to lawful employee off-duty conduct.250 Thus, procedurally aggrieved 
employees file a complaint with the California Department of Labor for lost wages due to 
adverse employment actions taken because of their lawful off-duty activities. The 
California Labor Commissioner then has statutory authority to investigate said complaint 
and if necessary hold a formal “hearing” on this matter.251 After said hearing the 
California Labor Commissioner is empowered to issue an enforceable order regarding the 
complaint, although the Commissioner’s order is appealable to state trial court.252
In sum, the majority of states in the United States currently have state statutes 
protecting the off-duty activities of employees at least to the extent said off-duty activity 
involves the lawful usage of tobacco. The ostensible reason behind these statutes was the 
key social value/importance of tobacco usage/smoking.253 Four states, including two of 
the nation’s largest states (i.e., California and New York) have significantly expanded the 
off-duty tobacco usage template to protect, albeit with various conflict of interest 
exceptions, all lawful off-duty employee conduct. All four states, however, have very 
different schemes for enforcing said statutes ranging from making them enforceable only 
in state trial court to having them subject to elaborate state labor department wage and 
hour administrative enforcement mechanisms. Lawfully blogging employees in the states 
of California, New York, Colorado, and North Dakota thus appear to currently enjoy 
some legal protection although the degree of protection and the ease/effectiveness of its
enforcement varies quite a bit.
250 See Cal. Lab. Code §§ 96, 98, 98.3, & 98.6.
251 Id. at § 98.
252 Id.
253 See Jackson, supra note 21 at 153.
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VII. Possible Avenues for Reform: The Appealing “Bright Lines” of State 
Legislative Action
A. Overview
Current law places employees who blog in a difficult position.  First, under state 
common law rules, there is for all practical purposes no protection.  Courts have been 
rather reluctant to expand existing exceptions to the at-will doctrine to cover off-duty 
related activities of employees, and blogging would appear to fare not differently.  
Second, only a handful of states have enacted comprehensive statutes protecting lawful 
employee off-duty activities such as blogging, and even in those few states there are both 
substantive and practical procedural limitations on the scope of said protection.  Finally, 
under the NLRA, employees’ blogging activity can be protected provided the blogging 
meets the requirements of concertedness and mutual aid or protection.  These 
requirements are likely to apply, though, only in situations where the blog is focused 
primarily, if not exclusively, on wages, hours and other terms and other conditions of 
employment.  Moreover, outside of unionized settings, employees are unlikely to know 
about their rights under the NLRA, and even where employees are aware of such rights 
the NLRA often presents considerable enforcement challenges.254  The upshot of all this 
is that the safest approach for employees currently probably is, as a July 24, 2005 
editorial column in the New York Times advised,255 not to blog at all.
254 See Bierman & Gely supra note 111 at 189.
255 See Matt Villano, Write All About It (At Your Own Risk), N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 
2005, at 10.
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However, to the extent that blogging, as we argue above, has considerable value 
as a generator of social capital, not only does the individual employee suffer, but so does
society at large. Thus, the question arises whether realistic legal rules could be devised 
that improve the current regime?  
The answer to the above question appears to be an equivocal “yes”. There appear 
to be three principal possible avenues for reform: (a) expand the protections of the 
NLRA; (b) expand the protections for employee bloggers under state common law, 
particularly under the public policy exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will; 
and/or (c) expand state legislative protections for employee bloggers, most logically 
using the existing template of protections for off-duty smokers. What follows is a brief 
review of these possible avenues for reform, with a recommendation for the adoption of 
above-listed option (c). Given the millions of current employee bloggers, with new 
millions being added literally each year, targeted “bright line” standards of the kind 
afforded by amending existing state off-duty conduct statues appear to offer the best and 
most appropriate legal reform solution.
B. NLRA Reform
As noted earlier,256 the NLRA does provide fairly comprehensive protection for 
employees blogging about clearly work-related issues where some connection or linkage 
(“concertedness”) with/to other workers is also fairly clear. There is, however, a major 
“notice” problem under the NLRA, in that very few non-unionized employees have even
256 See supra notes 118 to 147 and accompanying text.
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the slightest idea that the Labor Act affords them any protection in this regard.257 Unlike 
other agencies enforcing employment statutes, the NLRB has no field 
inspection/enforcement staff – rights under the NLRA get triggered only when an 
aggrieved employee specifically files a charge with the NLRB and asks the agency to get 
involved.258 In addition, as numerous observers have pointed out,259 the remedial 
provisions of the NLRA are weak and it can literally take years for employees to obtain 
redress under the Labor Act. 
All of the above issues were last grist for major congressional reform 
consideration about thirty years ago during the Labor Law Reform Act of 1977-78 
debates.260 Despite the existence of a pro-union Democratic President supporting NLRA 
reform legislation, and pro-union Democratic majorities in both the U.S. House of 
Representatives and the U.S. Senate, the legislative proposal after being passed by the 
House of Representatives ended up being successfully filibustered in the U.S. Senate.261
In today’s political context of a Republican President, and Republican majorities in the 
U.S. House and U.S. Senate significant NLRA reform seems extremely unlikely, 
particularly given the fact that the AFL-CIO and labor unions generally are in a much 
weaker economic/political  position today than they were back in 1977-78.262
257 See Bierman & Gely, supra note 111 at 188-89.
258 Id. at 188.
259 Id. at 188-89.
260 See, Comment, Labor Law Reform:  The Regulation of Free Speech and Equal 
Access in NLRB Representation Elections, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 755 (1979).
261 Id.
262 The precarious situation faced by the AFL-CIO has become somewhat more 
pronounced in recent months as a coalition of seven unions, known as the Change to Win 
Coalition, representing seven million union workers and 20 percent of the AFL-CIO’s 
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Indeed, even minor administrative agency reforms in this area appear unlikely. 
For example, Emeritus Law Professor Charles Morris of Southern Methodist University 
Law School has for the last decade had a rulemaking petition pending before the NLRB 
which would require all private sector employers (unionized and non-unionized) to put up 
a poster in their workplaces setting forth employee/employer rights under the NLRA.263
The NLRB, however, has yet to act on this petition,264 and without being unduly cynical, 
it appears unclear at best to what extent having such posters on workplace rest area 
bulletin boards would mark a meaningful shift in making non-unionized aware of (and 
willing to exercise) their rights under the NLRA.
Finally, it must be noted that at its heart the NLRA protects only work-related 
rights. Markedly improving notice, enforcement, and remedies of these rights even if 
speculatively possible would not deal with the fact that the NLRA does not protect non-
work-related employee activities such as non-work-related employee blogging. While 
Congress at least hypothetically could expand the NLRA into the non-work-related arena, 
such an expansion would not only be extraordinarily unlikely,265 it would also cut directly 
annual budget, has recently left the Federation.  Unions like the Service Employees 
International Union and UNITE-HERE, which represent workers in service industries, 
are dissatisfied with the AFL-CIO’s lack of commitment toward organizing activities.  
They argue that the AFL-CIO has failed to follow the work, and propose shifting 
organizing to service sectors of the economy, which are experiencing growth, citing 
employers such as Wal-Mart and Fed-Ex as examples. Steven Greenhouse, 4 Major 
Unions Plan to Boycott A.F.L.-C.I.O Event, THE NEW YORK TIMES, at A1, A16 (July 25, 
2005). 
263 See Rulemaking Petition of Professor Charles J. Morris to the National Labor 
Relations Board (Feb. 9, 2003) (on file with the authors).
264 Id.
265 See infra notes 261 to 262 and accompanying text.
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against the constitutional and legislative history underpinnings of the NLRA.266 In sum, 
the NLRA appears to be an unlikely avenue for the meaningful expansion of rights for 
employee bloggers.
C. State Common Law Reform
As noted above,267 historically state courts have permitted a public policy 
exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will only where private sector speech clearly 
touches on matters of “public concern”. For all practical purposes this has left employee 
bloggers with little protection.
Cornell Law School Dean Stewart J. Schwab, however, has argued for a 
significant expansion of the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine to 
broadly protect what he calls “third party effects.”268 According to Dean Schwab, more 
focus is necessary in this area of the law on the harm to third parties of not adequately 
protecting employees from adverse employment actions.269  Thus, for example, 
266 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
267 See supra notes 199 to 201 and accompanying text.
268 See Schwab supra note 231 at 1957-58.
269 Id. at 1950.  According to Professor Schwab, the focus should be on what he 
refers to as the “third-party effect”, that is, the extent to which refusing to protect the 
employee against the adverse employment action is likely to result in some harm to third 
parties.  The third party effect is stronger, and thus it is appropriate for the court to allow 
a wrongful discharge claim, in cases where employees are terminated for “refusing to 
perform and illegal act, fulfilling a public duty, or acting as an external whistleblower.” 
Id. at 1945.  On the other hand, where employees are fired for exercising a statutory right 
(such as filling a workers’ compensation claim), the third-party effect is lacking and thus, 
it is less appropriate for a court to find in the employee’s favor in a wrongful discharge 
against public policy claim. Id. at 1955.
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employees serving on jury duty create “public goods”,270 and absent common law 
doctrine protecting them from being fired for their service on jury duty these “public 
goods” will be under-produced and various third parties will be unduly harmed.271
If, as we strongly assert in this Article, employee blogging helps create the 
“public good” of social capital formation, Dean Schwab’s analysis provides at least a 
theoretical basis for its broad protection under the state public policy common law 
exception. Put another way, why can not all employee blogging be seen as involving 
matters of “public concern” deserving of public policy exception protection?
Despite its theoretical appeal, however, judicial creation of such a broad public 
policy exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will realistically appears highly 
unlikely. It’s one thing for state courts to say that employees can’t be fired for being on 
jury duty, and virtually all do so,272 and quite another to say that employees can not be 
fired for anything related to a very broadly construed notion of “public concern”. As we 
have seen in the State of Montana,273 state legislatures are more than free if they so desire 
270 See Mancur Olson, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND 
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).  Public-goods are likely to be under-produced, unless 
incentives are restructured.  The wrongful discharge cause of action accomplishes this by 
protecting employees against terminations, and thus providing the necessary incentives 
for both employers and employees to take into account the third-party effects of their 
actions.
271 See Schwab supra note 231 at 1951.  The costs of the employer’s actions are 
borne not by the employer but by third parties, i.e., society at large.  It does not hurt the 
employer much to make it more difficult for the judicial system to empanel a jury by 
making it more difficult for employees to fulfill their civic duty.  In some cases, as where 
the employer asks the employee to commit an illegal act, not only the employer bears no 
cost, but actually obtain a benefit at the expense of the public.  On the employee side, in 
this type of cases, the employee receives little benefit from confronting the employer or 
refusing to follow the employer’s orders.
272 See Perrit, supra note 189 at Vol. 2, p. 77.
273 See Mont. Code Ann. §§ 39-2-901-39-2-914.
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to statutorily overrule the doctrine of employment-at-will. State court expansion of the 
public policy exception to that doctrine of the kind we might suggest, though, would 
seem to be coming very close to judicial wholesale over-turning of the at-will doctrine, 
thus in appropriately placing state judges in the role of state legislators.274
D. State Legislative/Off-Duty Conduct Statutory Reform
Given the above, the best approach to the expansion of rights for employee 
bloggers appears to be at the state legislative level. It must be made clear that state 
legislatures do not have to adopt Montana-like comprehensive legislation overturning the 
“at-will” doctrine to attain reform in this area. The vast majority of states already have, as 
discussed earlier,275 targeted legislation in this area protecting the rights of employee off-
duty smokers, legislation which could easily be amended to also protect the rights of 
employee off-duty bloggers.
To the extent state off-duty employee smoking statutes were enacted in part to 
compensate employees for the ability of employers to regulate their ability to use tobacco 
during the working day,276 similar arguments also seem to exist with respect to employee 
blogging. For example, the states of Kentucky,277 Mississippi,278 New Mexico,279 and 
274
“[The] perception and declaration of relevant public policy … are best and 
more appropriately explored and resolved by the legislative branch of our government… 
If the rule of nonliability for termination of at-will employment is to be tempered, it 
should be accomplished through a principled statutory scheme, adopted after opportunity 
for public ventilation, rather than in consequence of judicial resolution of the partisan 
arguments of individual adversarial litigants.”  Murphy v. American Home Products, 448 
N.E.2d 86, 89-90 (N.Y. 1983).
275 See supra notes 232 to 253 and accompanying text.
276 See Jackson, supra note 21 at 145.
277 Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 61.165; 438.050; 344.03 et seq. (2005).
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Tennessee,280 all have specific language in their off-duty employee tobacco use 
protection statutes referring to the need for employees to be able to smoke off-duty in 
return for their compliance with possible employer rules prohibiting smoking while on 
the job. Regardless of the general “social capital” value of employee blogging, it would 
seem that employers should virtually always have the right to regulate employee 
computer usage during the working day,281 and thus especially insuring the rights of 
employees to use their computers as they see fit off-duty appears arguably deserving of 
special legislative protection.
Moreover, without entering the debate regarding the pros and cons of tobacco 
usage, it would appear that the “social value” of employee blogging is at least on a par 
with that of smoking, and that thus adding protection of this activity to extant state 
statutes protecting off-duty tobacco usage is philosophically entirely reasonable and 
appropriate. Such legislative action would, like the original legislation protecting tobacco 
usage, address an important social concern in a limited and targeted manner. Further, 
adding employee blogging protection to existing statutes would avoid the practical need 
to formulate new off-duty employee protection enforcement/remedial schemes. Existing 
“conflict of interest” and related provisions in the off-duty tobacco usage states would 
also simply apply as well with regard to employee blogging.
278 Miss. Code § 71-7-33 (2005).
279 N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-16-1 et seq.; 50-11-1 (2005).
280
 Tn. Code §§ 39-17-1604 et seq; 39-17-1551; 50-1-304 (2005).
281 Michael Selmi, Privacy for the Working Class, 66 La. L. R. __ (2006) (on file 
with the authors) (arguing that the employer should have broad control to monitor the 
employee while at the workplace).
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One additional issue, though, may be worthy of state legislative consideration in 
this regard. There is increasing empirical and other evidence282 with respect to the value 
of mediation/conciliation as a first step in the resolution of employee discharge and 
related cases. Thus adoption of the North Dakota model283 to the extent it initially 
requires mediation/conciliation in an attempt to resolve cases involving off-duty 
employee conduct/blogging would seem to make logical sense, and this would be a very 
simple “add on” to existing off-duty statutory protection language.
In sum, amendment of existing state statutes protecting off-duty employee 
tobacco usage appears to be the best avenue for reform in this area.  State legislation of 
this kind would be limited and targeted in nature, but also involve clear “bright lines”, 
i.e., employees in given states would clearly know their rights in this regard. It would put 
the role of partially overturning the doctrine of employment-at-will where it seems to 
most belong -- in the hands of elected state representatives. Most significantly, such 
legislation would protect all off-duty employee blogging, regardless of whether such 
blogging involves extensive discussion of the workplace, or not. As such, legislation of 
this kind would clearly and directly recognize the important social value of employee 
blogging, and particularly its key role in helping reverse the decline in American “social 
282 See Leonard Bierman, et al., Making Disputes Over Dismissals ‘Win-Win’ 
Situations,  63 HARV. BUS. REV. 160 (1985) (discussing empirical evidence on the use of 
mediation practices in the employment context); Leonard Bierman & Stuart A. 
Youngblood, Employment-At-Will:  A Mediatory Approach, 40 ARB. J. 48 (1985)
(same).
283 See N. Dakota Code Chapter § 14-02-4 (1995). See also How To File A 
Discrimination Complaint in North Dakota, Human Rights Division, North Dakota 
Department of Labor, www.nd.gov/labor/services/humanrights (last visited March 1, 
2006).
67
capital”. Off-duty employee blogging if given strong legal protection can play an 
important role in helping re-create a sense of American “community”.
VIII. Conclusion
As Professor Robert Putnam has amply documented, there has been a sharp 
decline in American “social capital” in recent decades. Employee blogs are already 
playing a significant role in helping overcome this decline, and the potential of such 
blogs in this regard is somewhat exponential as millions of new individuals enter the 
blogosphere each year. In many respects employee blogs are the new union hall 
connecting individuals together on both work and non-work matters. 
That said, however, most of today’s employee bloggers do not enjoy the legal 
protections afforded by the union hall of old.  For one, private sector employee bloggers 
are highly unlikely to be unionized workers covered by the “just cause” protections of 
collective bargaining agreements.  However, even if they are not union members, if the 
discussions in their blogs are very focused on work they may still enjoy protections under 
the National Labor Relations Act. There is an extremely strong probability, though, that 
they are not even aware of these protections, and reform of the NLRA to more clearly 
and expansively protect employee bloggers appears increasingly unlikely.
To the extent private sector employee bloggers discuss matters of critical “public 
concern” in their blogs, they may enjoy protection under the state common law public 
policy exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will. Such protections, though, are 
highly limited in nature. Moreover, while there are theoretical bases for expansion of the 
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public policy exception to better protect employee bloggers, any truly meaningful actions 
of this kind would effectively be putting state court judges in the role of state legislatures.
Thus, overall, it seems best to leave reform in this area to state legislatures 
themselves. The template for such reform already exists as the vast majority of state 
legislatures have previously enacted special legislation protecting the rights of employees 
to consume tobacco products during non-working hours. Since the special social value of 
employee off-duty blogging seems to be at least as high as that of employee off-duty 
smoking, adding protection of this activity to existing statutes appears to make sense. 
Such “bright line” legislative protection will allow employees to enter the union hall of 
the new millennium without fear, and to blog openly about work, non-work, or a mixture 
thereof as they see fit. With such protected blogging, American workers will no longer be 
“bowling alone”.
